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INTRODUCTION
Historically, very few nonprofit entities1 sought bankruptcy
protection; rather, when faced with insurmountable financial
difficulties, they simply dissolved.2 In the wake of the financial
crisis and in response to calls to operate more like for-profit
businesses,3 however, nonprofits have increasingly turned to
bankruptcy, filing petitions and planning to reorganize. Since
2008, charities, churches, dairy and utility cooperatives,
hospitals, the largest non-profit guarantor of private education
loans, a monorail, museums, performing arts groups, and
retirement communities have filed Chapter 11 petitions.4
1
The nonprofit sector encompasses a large and diverse set of organizations,
including churches, hospitals, schools, social organizations, museums, legal service
providers, and community cooperatives. Taken together, nonprofits hold more than
$1 trillion in assets and generate revenues of approximately $700 billion per year.
See Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotten, Contemplating “Enterprise”: The
Business and Legal Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 67, 67
(2003). No one definition of a nonprofit entity covers all nonprofit entities. See, e.g.,
id. at 69 (noting that some nonprofits are more “entrepreneurial”). For the purposes
of this Article, the only pertinent characteristic of nonprofits is their lack of equity
holders similar in nature to equity holders of for-profit entities. For example, Title
11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) does not define “nonprofit.”
The term, however, is generally understood to include any organizational structure
under which members, directors, or officers are precluded from receiving
distributions of income. In the context of bankruptcy, § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, which grants tax-exempt status to organizations formed for certain
purposes, is often referenced to determine nonprofit status, and covers organizations
providing charitable, educational, health care, literary, religious, scientific, and
various other services. Many states statutorily exclude towns, cities, and similar
municipal entities from the definition of “nonprofit.” See Andrew M. Troop, et al.,
Reorganizing with Value but Without Profit (or Equity): Select Confirmation Issues
for Nonprofit Entities, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 147, 148 (2010) (citing
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1057 (6th ed. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-1002 (2009)).
The Bankruptcy Code similarly distinguishes municipalities, with Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code providing for reorganization of municipalities. See
11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c)(1) (West 2011).
2
Stephanie Strom, Bankruptcy Now Touching Nonprofits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2009, at A17.
3
Id.
4
See, e.g., Bankruptcy Petition, In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 11-20059svk (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Jan. 4, 2011); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Crystal Cathedral
Ministries, No. 8:10-bk-24771-RK (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010); Bankruptcy
Petition, In re Naknek Elec. Ass’n, Inc., No. A10-00824 (Bankr. D. Alaska Sept. 29,
2010); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Saint Vincents Catholic Med. Ctrs. of N.Y., No. 1011963-cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2010); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Las Vegas
Monorail Co., No. 10-10464-bam (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 13, 2010); Bankruptcy
Petition, In re Erickson Ret. Cmtys., No. 09-37010-sgj11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 19,
2009); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, Inc., No. 09-13560
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Though the Bankruptcy Code does not prevent nonprofit
entities from filing Chapter 11 petitions,5 Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code was designed for and is predominately applied
to for-profit entities’ structure and business objectives.6 This
history and orientation often creates challenges for courts
administering nonprofit bankruptcies, most acutely in regards to
reviewing a nonprofit’s proposed plan of reorganization. With
nonprofit bankruptcy filings on the rise, courts will be presented
with nonprofits’ reorganization plans more and more often, and
they will be required to hone how the less applicable provisions of
Chapter 11 interact with a nonprofit’s plan. Simply because
Chapter 11 does not contemplate nonprofits’ unique structures
and operational goals does not mean that the guiding policies
behind the requirements of Chapter 11 should not apply with the
same force and intention to nonprofits. In an effort to bring
courts one step closer to applying the same rigorous approval
criteria to nonprofits’ reorganization plans, this Article focuses on
one crucial aspect of courts’ evaluation of plans—the fair and
equitable standard.
This standard, set forth in Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy
Code, requires that a plan of reorganization be “fair and
equitable” as to each class of creditors or interest holders that is
not paid in full7 and does not vote to accept the plan.8 The fair

(Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 18, 2009); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Humboldt Creamery, LLC,
No. 09-11078 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2009); Bankruptcy Petition, In re St. Mary’s
Hosp., No. 09-15619-MS (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 9, 2009); Bankruptcy Petition, In re
Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc., No. 09-10525-BFK (Bankr. E.D. Va. Jan. 24, 2009);
Bankruptcy Petition, In re Balt. Opera Co., Inc., No. 08-26265 (Bankr. D. Md. Dec. 9,
2008); Bankruptcy Petition, In re Copia, No. 08-12576 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Dec. 1,
2008); Bankruptcy Petition, In re The Educ. Res. Inst., Inc., No. 08-12540 (Bankr. D.
Mass. Apr. 7, 2008).
5
Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code governs what entities may file a
bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109 (West 2011). It allows a “person” to be a
debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 109(a). “Person” includes individuals,
partnerships, and corporations. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(41) (West 2011).
6
Section 77B was added to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the “Bankruptcy Act”)
specifically to regulate the reorganization of corporations. Section 77B was
superseded by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, which similarly applied to
corporations, and which remained in effect until the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code. See infra notes 54 & 58 and accompanying text.
7
Such classes are deemed “impaired.” A class of claims or interests is “impaired”
under a plan of reorganization if the plan alters the legal, equitable, or contractual
rights of the class. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (2006).
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and equitable standard operates among classes of creditors and
interest holders with different priorities, providing a vertical
limit on nonconsensual confirmation.9 The standard is triggered
when a debtor or other plan proponent wishes to “cramdown”10 a
plan of reorganization over the objection of an impaired or
dissenting class.
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define what it
means for a plan to be “fair and equitable,” at a minimum, it
explicitly requires that the plan satisfy the “absolute priority
rule.” Of pertinence to nonprofit reorganizations, the absolute
priority rule provides that only if a debtor pays its creditors in
full can owners receive any of the reorganized entity’s going

8
Section 1129 states sixteen potentially applicable criteria that a plan must
meet in order to be confirmed. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a) (West 2011). Pursuant to
11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(1),
if all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of [Section 1129] other
than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of
the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the
requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly,
and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests
that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.
Paragraph 8 of 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a) provides: “With respect to each class of claims
or interests—(A) such class has accepted the plan; or (B) such class is not impaired
under the plan.”
9
Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11,
72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 227–28 (1998); see also In re Simmons, 288 B.R. 737, 747
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (“[T]he term ‘fair and equitable’ establishes in chapter 11 a
test of vertical fairness . . . .”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 696, 703–04
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999).
10
For an explanation of “cramdown,” see generally Kenneth N. Klee, All You
Ever Wanted To Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979); Richard Maloy, A Primer on Cramdown—How and Why it
Works, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1 (2003); Isaac M. Pachulski, The Cram Down and
Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C. L. REV. 925 (1980).
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concern value.11 Thus, owners of a company cannot retain
ownership of the reorganized company unless each class of
creditors consents or is paid in full.
Satisfaction of the absolute priority rule, however, does not
guarantee that a court will find a proposed plan “fair and
equitable.”12 In not defining “fair and equitable,” the Bankruptcy
Code leaves the doctrine to be developed by case law and an
analysis of the origins of the standard.13 Nonetheless, because
the absolute priority rule is viewed as “the cornerstone of

11
See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 70 (1991) [hereinafter Absolute
Priority] ; Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
9, 9 (1991). The absolute priority rule is codified in 11 U.S.C.A § 1129(b)(2) (West
2011). Of pertinence, § 1129(b)(2)(B) reads:
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
....
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims—
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or
retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date
of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such
class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior
claim or interest any property . . . .
Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
“Owners” are those individuals and entities entitled under non-bankruptcy law to
any surplus in the value of a debtor, such as shareholders and partners. Absolute
Priority, supra note 11, at 70 n.2; see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI.
L. REV. 738, 740 n.8 (1988) (defining “owners” to include any individual or entity
that has a claim to the income stream or assets of the debtor). Going concern value is
the difference between the liquidation value of a debtor and the value of the business
if it continues operating. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 223 (1977).
12
See, e.g., Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. D & F Constr., Inc. (In re D & F
Constr. Inc.), 865 F.2d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Section 1129(b)(2) sets minimal
standards plans must meet. However, it is not to be interpreted as requiring that
every plan not prohibited be approved. A court must consider the entire plan in the
context of the rights of the creditors under state law and the particular facts and
circumstances when determining whether a plan is ‘fair and equitable.’ ”); East West
Bank v. Ravello Landing, LLC, 2:09-CV-02224-PMP-LRL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
101007, at *28–29 (D. Nev. Sept. 7, 2010) (noting that courts have described
§ 1129(b)(2) as “alternative minimum requirements for finding a plan fair and
equitable” and that although meeting the requirements of § 1129(b)(2) is necessary
for a plan to be confirmed, “it may not be sufficient for a fairness finding”); In re
Dollar Assocs., 172 B.R. 945, 952–53 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that a plan
was not fair and equitable despite satisfying § 1129(b)(2)); Kenneth N. Klee, Cram
Down II, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229, 229 (1990) [hereinafter Cram Down II] (discussing
“the uncodified aspects of the fair and equitable rule”).
13
Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 71–72.
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reorganization practice and theory,”14 it has largely become
synonymous with the fair and equitable standard.15 Accordingly,
when creditors of a nonprofit argue that a nonprofit’s proposed
plan of reorganization does not meet the fair and equitable
standard, they typically claim that the plan violates the absolute
priority rule.
When confronted with absolute priority claims in nonprofit
bankruptcies, courts have struggled with how to apply the rule to
plans that propose to allow pre-petition interest holders of the
nonprofit—such as directors, managers, or members—to retain
control of the nonprofit, or which appear to allocate going concern
value of the nonprofit to pre-petition interest holders or the
nonprofit itself without providing for or paying the nonprofit’s
creditors in full. Because the majority of nonprofits do not have
residual claimants similar to for-profit entities’ owners, any
management rights or going concern value retained by these prepetition interest holders or the nonprofit itself, seemingly by
definition, does not flow to the equity holders that the absolute
priority rule fundamentally addresses.16
Nevertheless,
conceptually, when a nonprofit’s plan allows directors or
managers to retain control or allocates going concern value to
members or merely to the nonprofit itself, creditors may view

14

Id. at 123.
See, e.g., Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus
Toward Settlement, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 78 (1986) (“Much of the Congressional
debate [regarding the Bankruptcy Code of 1979] revolved around the ‘fair and
equitable’ standards which had been cast in the form of the ‘absolute priority
rule’ . . . .”); Paul B. Lewis, Bankruptcy Thermodynamics, 50 FLA. L. REV. 329, 342
(1998) (“For impaired dissenting unsecured creditors, a plan is deemed to be fair and
equitable if it satisfies the terms of the absolute priority rule.”).
16
The Bankruptcy Code does not define “interest.” Courts generally hold that
“interest” is limited to an equity interest in the debtor. See, e.g., Osborn v. Univ.
Med. Assocs., No. 2-01-4002-18, 2003 WL 25734356, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2003)
(“[P]laintiff has conceded that a private individual may not possess an ownership
interest in a nonprofit entity . . . . ”); In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen &
Helpers Union Local 890, 225 B.R. 719, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998) (“An ‘interest’ is
that which is held by an ‘equity security holder,’ pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 501(a); an
‘equity security holder’ is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) as the ‘holder of an equity
security of the debtor’; an ‘equity security’ is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(16) as a
share in a corporation ‘or similar security’ (or certain warrants or rights concerning
the same), or the interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership (or certain
warrants or rights concerning the same).”). As specifically applied to the absolute
priority rule, courts hold that “interest” means “equity interest.” In re Wabash
Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash II), 72 F.3d 1305, 1313 (7th Cir. 1995); see also infra
Part I (detailing the development of the absolute priority rule).
15
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such a plan as tantamount to the nonprofit’s “owners” receiving
value. And if the plan does not pay creditors in full, creditors
will object.
The few courts that have decided absolute priority claims in
nonprofit bankruptcies overall hold that because the majority of
nonprofits do not have “owners” who hold “equity interests”
resembling for-profit businesses’ equity holders, the absolute
priority rule is categorically satisfied by—and, thus, categorically
inapplicable to—nonprofit entities. These courts have engaged in
a fact-specific analysis of the ownership structure of the nonprofit
at issue,17 focusing particularly on the retained “interest” or
“control” in question and considering whether the nonprofit
substantively is more akin to a for-profit entity for the purposes
of the rule.18
17
Some courts seemingly have concluded that the structural limitations of
nonprofits render the absolute priority rule categorically inapplicable without the
need for a fact-specific analysis of the ownership structure at issue. See, e.g., In re
Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 282 B.R. 444, 453 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
Hospital’s nonprofit status puts creditors in an unusually disadvantaged negotiating
position because they are not able to assert the Bankruptcy Code’s absolute priority
rule to block unacceptable plans . . . . ”); In re Independence Vill., Inc., 52 B.R. 715,
726 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (“[The debtor] is a non-profit corporation. It has no
shareholders, hence there are no interests inferior to the unsecured creditors. Thus
there should be little difficulty with the absolute priority rule . . . . ”) (citations
omitted); Amelia Rawls, Comment, Applying the Absolute Priority Rule to Nonprofit
Enterprises in Bankruptcy, 118 YALE L.J. 1231, 1233–34 (2009) (“[Some courts] have
concluded that old interest holders of a nonprofit are permitted to control it
throughout its reorganization process, reasoning that the operational limitations
inherent to nonprofits render the absolute priority rule effectively irrelevant. On the
other hand, [other courts] have not inferred any inevitability about nonprofit
compliance with absolute priority, applying the rule on fact-specific grounds to reject
reorganization Plans that allowed old interests to be preserved.”). These courts,
however, only considered the absolute priority rule secondarily to their main
analyses. Those courts that fully addressed the rule in the context of a nonprofit
reorganization engaged in a fact-specific analysis of the subject nonprofit even if the
court’s ultimate conclusion was that the absolute priority rule did not apply to the
“interest” or “control” retained. See infra Part III.
18
See, e.g., Sec. Farms v. Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Union,
Local 890 (In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890), 265
F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the contractual right to escheatment of a
labor union’s parent did not create any immediate ownership in the union for the
purposes of the absolute priority rule, and thus affirming the bankruptcy court’s
confirmation of the plan); Wabash II, 72 F.3d at 1320 (“Control of the cooperative
provides no opportunity, either currently or in the future, for the Members to obtain
profits or any equity in Wabash’s assets and control itself is not an equity interest.”);
S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc., 252 B.R. 373, 388–89 (E.D.
Tex. 2000) (holding that patronage stock was property of the debtor’s members that
they could not retain through reorganization unless creditors were paid in full).
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Moreover, in line with the common perception that the
absolute priority rule is synonymous with the fair and equitable
standard, despite the reach of the standard beyond the rule, only
one of the courts addressing absolute priority claims in the
context of a nonprofit reorganization seemed to consider whether
the nonprofit debtor had demonstrated that the standard was
otherwise satisfied before holding the challenged plan to be “fair
and equitable.”19 At best, certain statements in a few other
opinions indicate that those courts understood the fair and
equitable standard to encompass more than the absolute priority
rule.20 In the end, once courts dispense with the absolute priority
rule, they uniformly hold the challenged plan to be “fair and
equitable.”
These courts have missed an opportunity to develop a body of
case law that explains what “fair and equitable” means in the
non-profit reorganizations.
Though the statutorily codified
absolute priority rule may not apply to nonprofits, or only in
certain circumstances, the theory underlying the rule does not

19
See Wabash II, 72 F.3d at 1318 (stating that “[t]he absolute priority rule is an
aspect of the requirement that a plan be ‘fair and equitable’ ” and that “[t]here is
some appearance of unfairness in the Wabash Plan,” but then concluding that those
aspects of the plan were not as unfair as they may seem at first blush). In addition,
after addressing the absolute priority rule, the court in In re Whittaker Memorial
Hospital Ass’n, further held that “[t]he plan is fair and equitable to creditors.” 149
B.R. 812, 816 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993). In so holding, the court wrote one sentence: “A
single creditor is objecting and its particular complaints addressed.” Id. The relevant
“complaints” were (1) that the plan violated the absolute priority rule, (2) that the
plan provided for disparate treatment of unsecured creditors, and (3) that, because
the plan violated the absolute priority rule and treated unsecured creditors
disparately, the plan was not fair and equitable. Id. at 815. Disparate treatment is
addressed by the Bankruptcy Code’s “unfair discrimination” standard and is distinct
from the fair and equitable standard. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b) (West 2011);
Markell, supra note 9, at 227–28 (explaining that the “unfair discrimination” and
fair and equitable standards provide separate horizontal and vertical protections to
creditors). Thus, the only aspect of the fair and equitable standard that the court
considered was the absolute priority rule.
20
See, e.g., In re Gen. Teamsters, 265 F.3d at 877 ( “[T]he plan represented the
[union]’s honest effort to satisfy the demands of its creditors.”); In re Whittaker
Mem’l Hosp., 149 B.R. at 817 (noting, in dicta, that “the debtor must give priority,
next to the care of its patients, to the position of [a certain creditor] . . . . [The
creditor] is financing all of this and the debtor must be dedicated and determined
that for [the creditor]’s sake the plan is successfully consummated.”); In re Wabash
Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash I), No. 85-2238-RWV-11, 1991 WL 11004220, at *60
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 1991) (“Wabash’s Plan satisfies the economic
underpinnings of the absolute priority rule because it converts every piece of
economic property in Wabash into cash to be paid to its creditors.”).
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lose its vitality in the context of a nonprofit’s reorganization plan.
If a nonprofit debtor proposes a plan that would not satisfy the
absolute priority rule if the nonprofit’s interest holders were
equity holders of a for-profit entity, merely because the debtor is
a nonprofit and the retained “interest” at issue does not rise to
the level of a for-profit “interest,” it does not follow that the plan
is magically fair and equitable. These courts’ failure to examine
the parallels between for-profit and nonprofit reorganization and
the interconnectedness of the absolute priority rule and the fair
and equitable standard has nurtured scholarship that proposes a
limited view of the absolute priority rule’s relevance to nonprofit
reorganization, advises that the rule is easily circumvented, and
merely expresses dismay that the rule cannot be used by
creditors of nonprofits.21
Reorganization aims to restructure an ailing business’s
operations, preserving value that may be lost through
liquidation.22 The absolute priority rule prohibits equity holders
from receiving this value ahead of creditors until all creditors are
paid in full. The rule provides a powerful check on the ability of
a debtor to propose a plan of reorganization that simply is too
good a deal for its owners, and, thereby, itself. As evidenced by
case law addressing absolute priority claims in the context of
nonprofit reorganization, however, the rule does not apply
cleanly to nonprofit entities because of their lack of equity
holders. This has lead courts overall to hold that the absolute
priority rule is inapplicable to nonprofits. In so holding, courts
have removed an essential check in the reorganization process.
This Article proposes a theory that will restore this check by
linking the absolute priority rule with the fair and equitable
standard, making the rule robust enough to handle the nontraditional structures of nonprofit entities.

21
See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., “Sovereignty” Issues and the Church Bankruptcy
Cases, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 345, 355–58 (2005) (discussing how the absolute
priority rule may not apply in church bankruptcies); Troop, supra note 1, at 148–53
(advising how to “[r]etain[] [c]ontrol [w]ithout [p]ayment in [f]ull[]”); Rawls, supra
note 17, at 1234–35 (distinguishing between nonprofit entities with an
“entrepreneurial” structure and a “mutual” structure and suggesting that the
absolute priority rule should apply to “mutual” nonprofits).
22
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977) (“The purpose of a business
reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a business’s finances
so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its
creditors . . . . It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate . . . .”).
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The remainder of this Article proceeds in two stages. First,
Parts II, III, and IV provide the background necessary to develop
the theory. Part II chronicles the development of the fair and
equitable standard and the absolute priority rule. This history is
important to understanding the interconnectedness of the rule
with the standard. Part III details the key functions of the
absolute priority rule and the rule’s application to for-profit
entities, with an emphasis on concerns regarding its
compatibility with close corporations. This review highlights
how courts’ current application of the absolute priority rule to
nonprofits contravenes the rule’s purposes and deviates from the
rule’s application to functionally similar for-profit entities,
thereby creating situations in which plans that courts otherwise
may reject are confirmed simply because the reorganizing
entities are nonprofits. Next, before the Article sets forth a
theory that reconciles this deviation, Part IV overviews the
limited body of case law analyzing the rule’s operation in
nonprofit bankruptcies. This overview provides one of the first
compilations of cases dealing with nonprofit bankruptcies and
begins to create a history of nonprofit reorganization.
The last three parts of the Article develop a theory of how
the absolute priority rule, by way of its core tenets, applies to all
nonprofit entities through the fair and equitable standard.
Combining the insights of Parts II and III with current case law,
Part V first sets forth the theory and then provides examples of
the theory’s application. Part VI suggests criticisms of the theory
and, responding to those criticisms, explores the implications of
applying Chapter 11 to nonprofits. Finally, Part VII offers
concluding thoughts about the expanded utility of the absolute
priority rule.
I.

A.

HISTORY OF THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE STANDARD AND THE
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE
Foundational Case Law

Both the term “fair and equitable” and the absolute priority
rule originated with the railroad insolvencies and equity
receiverships of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
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centuries.23 Railroads were expanding rapidly and investors
were freely contributing capital, but many of the railroads could
not generate revenue sufficient to meet their debts. With the
help of a creditor, the railroad would become subject to an “equity
receivership.”24 The receiver would sell the railroad’s assets to a
newly created entity, which usually was controlled by the
stockholders of the old railroad. To acquire the old railroad, after
negotiating with bondholders, the “new” investors would pay an
amount less than the total due on the old railroad’s senior debt,
either paying off or issuing new debt to the bondholders and
completely eliminating the old railroad’s unsecured debt.
Through this rearranging of ownership and payment scheme, the
old railroad would become the new railroad absent any
unsecured debt and a portion of senior debt. Most importantly,
the old railroad’s management, bondholders, and investors—who
often were the same—would remain in control.25
Understandably, this trick enraged unsecured creditors. The
best way for them to protest that the “old” stockholders were
being treated unjustifiably favorably to the unsecured creditors’
detriment was to sue the “new” railroad and/or stockholders26
and, relying on fraudulent conveyance law, argue that the
foreclosure defrauded unsecured creditors.27 The first time the

23
The history of the absolute priority rule has been detailed repeatedly since the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute
Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 969–79 (1989); Douglas G. Baird &
Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s Ghost, 1999 SUP. CT. REV.
393, 397–425 (1999); Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 74–90; Pachulski, supra
note 10, at 938–45. This Article highlights those aspects of its history most pertinent
to the rule’s application to nonprofits.
24
The creditor would initiate a proceeding in federal court, claim that the
railroad could not meet its debts as they became due, and request “the court to use
its equity power to administer the property for the satisfaction of claims, and to
appoint a receiver to keep the business going in the meantime: hence, ‘equity
receivership.’ ” Ayer, supra note 21, at 970.
25
See id.; see also Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N.
Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 94 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash
II), 72 F.3d 1305, 1314 (7th Cir. 1995); Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 76.
26
Because foreclosure courts, where the old railroad’s assets were sold, typically
believed themselves limited to deciding the sale price, unsecured creditors’
remaining recourse was to attack the new railroad and stockholders. See Randolph
J. Haines, The Unwarranted Attack on New Value, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 387, 398
(1998).
27
Under common law, a transfer was considered fraudulent if it was intended to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. See Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 76; Baird
& Rasmussen, supra note 23, at 398.
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Supreme Court was presented with such a trick, instead of
selling the railroad back to its original owners, the railroad
merely sought to pay stockholders ahead of unsecured creditors.
In Railroad Co. v. Howard,28 the railroad owed $7 million to
secured bondholders.
Upon insolvency, the railroad’s
stockholders negotiated with the bondholders to sell the railroad
to a newly-formed entity and to distribute the proceeds to the
bondholders and stockholders.29 As agreed, the new entity
purchased the railroad for $5.5 million and distributed sixteen
percent to the stockholders.30 Thereby, the secured bondholders
received approximately $5 million on their $7 million claim,
unsecured creditors received nothing, and the stockholders
received approximately $500,000.
Unsecured creditors asserted that the stockholders could not
be paid before all unsecured creditors were paid in full.31 In
response, the bondholders argued that the payment to the
stockholders did not originate from the railroad, but, rather, was
property of the bondholders that they gratuitously gave to the
stockholders so as to expedite the foreclosure sale.32
The Supreme Court began its analysis with two fundamental
principles: the railroad’s assets were “held in trust for the
payment of the debts of the [railroad],”33 and “[c]reditors are
preferred to stockholders on account of the peculiar trust in their
favor.”34 Next, it rejected the bondholders’ contention that money
paid to the stockholders belonged to the bondholders.35 From
there, it held that the unsecured creditors were entitled to the
money distributed to the stockholders.36
28

74 U.S. 392 (1868).
Id. at 408.
30
Id. at 408–09.
31
Id. at 413.
32
R.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392, 411 (1868).
33
Howard, 74 U.S. at 409.
34
Id. at 411.
35
“Holders of bonds secured by mortgage as in this case, may exact the whole
amount of the bonds, principal and interest, or they may, if they see fit, accept a
percentage as a compromise in full discharge of their respective claims, but
whenever their lien is legally discharged, the property embraced in the mortgage, or
whatever remains of it, belongs to the corporation . . . . Prompt payment was secured
by the bondholders, and it is highly probable that they received under that
arrangement a larger portion of their claims than they could have obtained in any
other way.”
Id. at 414–15.
36
Id. at 410.
29
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Perhaps the most pressing unanswered questions of Howard
were whether the Court would have found for the unsecured
creditors if the stockholders received ownership in the acquiring
entity rather than cash37 and whether unsecured creditors could
agree to allow stockholders to receive payment or ownership.38
Despite the outstanding issues coupled with the Court’s clear
statement of creditors’ rights, railroad reorganizations continued
in the same manner for the next forty-five years,39 unabated even
after the Supreme Court’s first encounter with a fully
manipulative equity receivership scheme.
In Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago
Railway Co.,40 after entering into receivership, the railroad sold
itself to the existing bondholders and stockholders, thereby
ridding itself of troublesome unsecured debt.41 Before striking
down the scheme, the Supreme Court noted that the “peculiar
character and conditions of” railroads as “[i]nstrument[s] of
public service” justified the elevation of unsecured creditors as
against “contract and recorded liens”42 and then held that any
sale “which attempts to preserve any interest or right of [the
stockholders] in the [railroad] after the sale must necessarily
secure and preserve the prior rights of general creditors
thereof.”43 Following this statement, the Court announced what
evolved into the absolute priority rule:
[S]tockholder’s interest in the property is subordinate to the
rights of creditors. First, of secured, and then of unsecured,
creditors. And any arrangement of the parties by which the
subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are
attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of
either class of creditors comes within judicial denunciation.44

Not until 1913 did the Supreme Court have a chance to
bolster its position in Howard. When it did, it rendered an
opinion that ushered in “[t]he modern law of corporate

37

See Haines, supra note 26, at 400; Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 77 n.47.
This question is most often linked with subsequent cases decided by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 15, at 72–74. Regardless, the question is
equally applicable to Howard.
39
Haines, supra note 26, at 400.
40
174 U.S. 674 (1899).
41
Id. at 679–81.
42
Id. at 682.
43
Id. at 684.
44
Id.
38
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reorganizations”45 and lead to the death of railroad receivership
schemes that violated the fully articled “absolute priority rule.”46
As in Howard and Louisville Trust, Northern Pacific Railway Co.
v. Boyd47 involved a railroad selling itself to bondholders and
stockholders without providing payment or property to unsecured
creditors. Relying on fraudulent conveyance law, Boyd, an
unsecured creditor, alleged that the old railroad’s debts to Boyd
and other unsecured creditors became liabilities of the new entity
upon transfer and that unsecured creditors must be paid before
stockholders could receive property from the new entity.48 The
Court further noted that the property received by the new
company was “property out of which the creditors were entitled
to be paid before the stockholders could retain it for any purpose
whatever.”49 Thereby, Boyd announced a “fixed principle”50 that
45

Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 23, at 397.
See, e.g., Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.),
634 F.3d 79, 99 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court “finally set down the
‘fixed principle’ that we now call the absolute priority rule” in N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 507 (1913).); Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 78 (“After Boyd,
reorganizations would never be the same.”). The term “absolute priority rule”
originated in the article Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in
a Corporate Reorganization by James C. Bonbright and Milton M. Bergerman. 28
COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1928). As discussed below, Boyd did not adopt the absolute
priority rule, but, rather, what is termed the “fair offer” standard. See infra note 53
and accompanying text. Thereby, Boyd engendered debate as to whether its
articulated standards required a senior class be paid in full before any value could
be distributed to a junior class—that is, an “absolute priority rule”—or merely
required that a senior class receive payment or property of greater value than that
received by a junior class—that is, a “relative priority rule.” See Haines, supra note
26, at 401–02; Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 82. This debate was resolved in
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., with the Supreme Court’s statement that
“fair and equitable” are “words of art which . . . had acquired a fixed meaning
through judicial interpretations”: “the absolute or full priority doctrine of the Boyd
case . . . .” 308 U.S. 106, 115, 123 (1939). The Court confirmed its upholding of the
absolute priority rule two years later in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois,
312 U.S. 510 (1941). Nevertheless, the standard adopted in Boyd substantively
mirrors the absolute priority rule codified in 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2) (West 2011).
See Edward S. Adams, Toward a New Conceptualization of the Absolute Priority
Rule and Its New Value Exception, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1445, 1455–56 (1993).
47
228 U.S. 482 (1913).
48
Id. at 501; see also Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 79 n.62 (“The
arguments of counsel for the [new entity] make clear that Boyd alleged that the sale
of the [r]ailroad’s assets to the [new entity] was fraudulent as to his claim against
the [r]ailroad.”).
49
Boyd, 228 U.S. at 508. The Court concluded that it did not matter that the
sale price of the railroad was less than the debt owed to bondholders:
[T]he question must be decided according to a fixed principle, not leaving
the rights of the creditors to depend upon the balancing of evidence as to
46
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creditors must receive property or payment on account of their
interests before equity can receive anything on account of its
interests.51 Under Boyd, this requirement translated to creditors
receiving a “fair offer.”52 Congress codified Boyd’s concepts of a
“fair offer” and a “fixed principle” as the fair and equitable
standard and the absolute priority rule.
B.

Statutory Codification

The rule announced in Boyd and subsequently honed in
several Supreme Court cases53 was first included in the 1933 and
1934 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, which added Sections
77 and 77B.54 Sections 77 and 77B each required that a court
find a plan “fair and equitable”55 before confirming it, thereby
codifying Boyd’s “fair offer” concept.56
In addition, the

whether, on the day of sale, the property was insufficient to pay prior
encumbrances . . . . If the value of the [rail]road justified the issuance of
stock in exchange for old shares, the creditors were entitled to the benefit of
that value, whether it was present or prospective, for dividends or only for
purposes of control.
Id. at 507–08.
50
Case, 308 U.S. at 116.
51
See Haines, supra note 26, at 401; Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 80–81.
52
See Haines, supra note 26, at 402; Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 81; see
also Baird & Jackson, supra note 11, at 744 (“The basic lesson of Boyd . . . is that
leaping over an intermediate class triggers special scrutiny.”).
53
See, e.g., Ecker v. W. Pac. R.R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448, 452–53 (1943) (discussing
valuation); Marine Harbor Props., Inc. v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 85 (1942)
(“Under the rule of [Boyd] and [Case], a plan of reorganization would not be fair and
equitable which in such circumstances admitted the stockholders to participation,
unless the stockholders made a fresh contribution in money or in money’s worth in
return for ‘a participation reasonably equivalent to their contribution.’ ” (quoting
Case, 308 U.S. at 121)); Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 520 (1941)
(discussing valuation); Case, 308 U.S. at 122 (confirming that Boyd adopted the
absolute priority rule); Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union Trust Co., 271
U.S. 445, 454–55 (1926) (articulating what has become known as the “new value
exception” to the absolute priority rule).
54
Section 77 applied to railroad corporations and Section 77B applied to other
corporations. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474; Act of June 7,
1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912. The original Bankruptcy Act contained no
provisions for reorganization, and, consequently, no “fair and equitable” principle.
55
As originally enacted, Section 77 only required that a plan be “equitable.” Act
of Mar. 3, 1933 § 77(g). After the adoption of Section 77B, in 1935, the words “fair
and” were added before “equitable.” Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 774, § 77(e)(1), 49 Stat.
911, 918.
56
Neither Section 77 nor Section 77B state that claims must be paid according
to an “absolute priority rule.” Rather, in Case, the Supreme Court held that “fair and
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Bankruptcy Act’s “fair and equitable” requirement was stricter
than the Bankruptcy Code’s: it applied to each individual creditor
regardless of whether the plan was accepted by all classes of
creditors.57
Chapter X superseded Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act in
1938 and remained in effect until the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1978.58 It similarly required that a plan be
“fair and equitable” regardless of whether the plan was accepted
by all classes of creditors.59
And the Supreme Court
subsequently confirmed that the absolute priority rule equally
applied to Chapter X.60 In 1938, Congress also added Chapter XI
to the Bankruptcy Act. Chapter XI dealt with the reorganization
of unsecured debt and initially contained the same “fair and
equitable” requirement as Chapter X. Reflecting Chapter XI’s
aim to encourage settlement, Congress deleted the “fair and
equitable” standard in 1952.61
The Bankruptcy Code brought sweeping reforms to the field
of bankruptcy. It made two significant changes to the application
of “fair and equitable” and the absolute priority rule. First,
drawing upon Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, the fair and
equitable standard allows for consensual plans that are not “fair
and equitable” and only applies to classes of creditors.62 This

equitable” as used in these Sections are “words of art” that include the absolute
priority rule. Case, 308 U.S. at 115, 123.
57
Section 77 provided that unsecured debts were discharged if “two-thirds in
amount of such creditors shall have accepted the plan in writing.” Act of Mar. 3,
1933 § 77(h)(6). Section 77B provided that confirmation required two-thirds of each
creditor class vote to confirm a plan. Act of June 7, 1934, § 77B(e)(1) (repealed 1938).
Courts, however, could ignore the creditors’ vote and confirm the plan. See Absolute
Priority, supra note 11, at 83 n.94. Confirmation discharged “all creditors, secured or
unsecured.” Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B(g)(3), 48 Stat. 911, 920 (repealed
1938); see also Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 88 n.124 (noting that individual
creditors could challenge a plan based on the “fair and equitable” requirement,
allowing individual creditors to “bargain for every last dollar of going concern
value”); Pachulski, supra note 10, at 938.
58
The Chandler Act was adopted on June 22, 1938. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52
Stat. 883 (1938). Chapter X was codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 501–676 (1976) (repealed
1978).
59
11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1976) (repealed 1978).
60
Consol. Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 530–31 (1941).
61
Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433.
62
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a), § 1129(b) only applies if a class of impaired
creditors or interest holders does not accept a plan. 11 U.S.C.A § 1129(a)(8) (West
2011); see also Booth, supra note 15, at 79 (“[S]ection 1129(a) harks back to Chapter
XI . . . .”).
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relaxation of the strict requirement of Chapter X that a plan
must be “fair and equitable” as to each individual creditor
stemmed from a desire to encourage deal making and settlement
with debtors.63 In place of the absolute priority rule, individual
creditors receive the “best interests of creditors” test, thus
ensuring that each creditor recovers at least the liquidation value
of its claim, but allowing excess going concern value to be
distributed to classes of creditors based on negotiations amongst
themselves and with the debtor.64
Second, drawing upon Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,
Section 1129(b) formally articulates the absolute priority rule.65
Section 1129(b)(2) provides three distinct, but substantively
similar requirements of what is “fair and equitable”: one for
secured classes, one for unsecured classes, and one for classes of
interest.66 Moreover, the text of Section 1129(b)(2) makes the
absolute priority rule a mandatory, but not sufficient, condition
to finding that a plan is “fair and equitable.”67 The term
“includes,” which the Bankruptcy Code specifically states is openended,68 grants courts the ability to and almost demands that
they continue to develop what constitutes Boyd’s “fair offer.”

63
See, e.g., Richard F. Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 BUS. LAW. 441, 443 (1984) (“Early in the
process, most of the knowledgeable commentators on bankruptcy concluded that, if
not abandoned completely, the absolute priority rule should be modified in major
respects. The importance of deal-making in the reorganization process was
recognized.”).
64
11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(7); see also Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 88
(“Once the creditor received its liquidation value, the [Bankruptcy] Code allocated
the surplus of going concern value over liquidation value by democratic vote within
and among classes of creditors.”).
65
See Booth, supra note 15, at 79 (“[S]ection 1129(b) [harkens back] to Chapter
X.”).
66
11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2).
67
Id. at § 1129(b)(2) (“[T]he condition that a plan be fair and equitable with
respect to a class includes the following requirements . . . .” (emphasis added)); see,
e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 23, at 417–18 (“The structure of the clause
invites us to see the specific requirement that equityholders receive nothing on
account of their prior interest as an integral component of a ‘fair and equitable’
plan . . . . However much judges continue to refine the ‘fair and equitable’ standard,
they cannot return to a regime of relative priority.”); Cram Down II, supra note 12,
at 230.
68
11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (2006) (noting that “includes” is “not limiting”); see also
supra note 12.
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Legislative history further makes clear that Section 1129(b)
requires that a court consider more than the absolute priority
rule when determining if a plan is “fair and equitable.”
Overall, Congress crafted Section 1129(b) with the aim to
moderate the effects of Chapter X’s strict application of the
absolute priority rule, but still retain the core insights of the “fair
offer” concept that led to the “fair and equitable” principle. The
Report of the Bankruptcy Commission (“Report”), delivered in
1973, significantly influenced Congress’s initial draft of the bill
that would become the Bankruptcy Code.69
The Report
essentially proposed to gut the absolute priority rule.
It
recommended that broad discretion be given to bankruptcy
courts to allow equity to receive a portion of the debtor’s going
concern value even if creditors were not paid in full,70 and that
individual shareholders be permitted to participate in the
reorganized company if the court determined they would make
an “essential” contribution.71 The Report engendered strong
criticism and heated debate.72 Taking this criticism and the
compromises reached among the business, academic, and
government sectors into account,73
Congress considerably
tempered the Report’s recommendation.
The House submitted the first draft of what would become
Section 1129(b). The House’s initial attempt contained the
simple statement that a court could confirm a plan “if such plan
is fair and equitable with respect to all classes except any class
that has accepted the plan.”74 Before being sent to the Senate,

69

COMM’N. ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1 (1973).
Part II contains the Commission’s proposed bill. Id. pt. 2.
70
Id. pt. 2, at 242.
71
Id. at 258; see also Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 87 n.117 (discussing
the H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137).
72
See, e.g., Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine
in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651, 651–52 (1974); Victor Brudney,
The Bankruptcy Commission’s Proposed “Modifications” of the Absolute Priority
Rule, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 308 (1974) (“[T]he Commission both proclaims its
attachment to the absolute priority rule and proposes effectively to abolish the
rule.”); Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 87–88 nn.118–120 (citing statements of
representatives from the business, academic, and government sectors); Note, The
Proposed Bankruptcy Act: Changes in the Absolute Priority Rule for Corporate
Reorganizations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1786, 1786–87 (1974).
73
See Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 88.
74
As initially introduced, § 1129(b) of H.R. 6 read:
THE
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the House revised its draft to define “fair and equitable”
treatment without using the words “fair and equitable” but,
rather, by listing multiple examples of what constituted a “fair
and equitable” plan, including that a plan must satisfy the
absolute priority rule.75 The House described its final submission
as a “partial codification” of the absolute priority rule and as
focused on allocating the going concern value of a debtor to
creditors.76
The Senate’s input led to important changes to the House’s
bill, which were included in the enacted Section 1129(b). The
final version effectively combined the initial and final version of
the House’s bill. The first subsection explicitly incorporated the
words “fair and equitable,” harkening back to the House’s initial
draft, and the second subsection provided three examples of what
is “fair and equitable,” adopting a portion of the House’s
definitions of “fair and equitable.”77 Congress made clear that
the second subsection’s examples were not an exhaustive list of
what constituted “fair and equitable” treatment: “[M]any of the
factors interpreting ‘fair and equitable’ . . . , which were
explicated in the description of section 1129(b) in the House
report, were omitted from the House amendment . . . . [T]he

(b) If all of the requirements of subsection (a) of this section other than
paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the
proponent of such plan, shall confirm such plan notwithstanding such
paragraph if such plan is fair and equitable with respect to all classes
except any class that has accepted the plan and that is comprised of claims
or interests on account of which the holders of such claims or interests will
receive or retain under the plan not more than would be so received or
retained under a plan that is fair and equitable with respect to all classes.
H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (as initially introduced Jan. 4, 1977).
75
H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (as introduced in Mar. 21, 1977); H.R. 7330, 95th
Cong., § 1129(b) (as introduced in May 23, 1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (as
introduced in July 11, 1977); and H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 1129(b) (as introduced in
Sept. 8, 1977).
76
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP.
NO. 95-595, at 223, 414 (1977) (“[C]reditors are entitled to be paid according to the
going-concern value of the business.”).
77
H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 32,350 (1978). Despite these
changes, the statements in the House’s committee report retain their vitality: “[I]n
lieu of a Conference Report, [Congress] read virtually identical statements into both
the House and Senate records on the bill. As noted at the time, Congress believed
that this procedure imbued such remarks with ‘the effect of being a conference
report.’ ” Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 89 n.131 (citations omitted) (quoting
124 CONG. REC. 32,391 (1978) (statement of Rep. Rousselot)).
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deletion is intended to be one of style and not one of substance.”78
Omitted concepts include the requirements that no creditor
receive more than its non-bankruptcy entitlement, that no senior
class receive more than 100 percent of its claims if there is a
dissenting class, that a senior dissenting class be compensated if
it loses priority relative to a junior class, and that no “worthless
securities” be issued.79 Most importantly, this list demonstrates
“the open texture of the statute,”80 inviting courts to extrapolate
from legislative history and case law what amounts to a “fair and
equitable” plan.
II. FUNCTION AND TRADITIONAL APPLICATION OF THE ABSOLUTE
PRIORITY RULE
As evident by its historical and legislative underpinnings, at
its core, the absolute priority rule is about fraudulent
conveyance.81 It protects creditors by guaranteeing that a court
will not confirm a plan that subordinates their claims to the
benefit of the debtor’s equity holders without the creditors’
consent. Consequently, it reassures creditors that they will
receive all available going concern value up to the amount of
their claims unless they agree otherwise. Only once all creditors’
claims are satisfied in full can a plan allocate any remaining
going concern value elsewhere.82 The absolute priority rule
thereby prevents equity holders from taking advantage of any
insider status or colluding with senior creditors to get rid of
intermediate claimants.
If such a rule did not exist, as
manifested by the railroad reorganizations that gave rise to the
rule, senior creditors and equity holders—who also may be
management—or other junior claimants seemingly could agree to
give intermediate creditors’ property to equity holders or other

78
124 CONG. REC. 34,006 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); see also id. at
32,407 (statement of Rep. Edwards); Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 89
(“[C]ourts were not to exclude other components and interpretations.”).
79
Cram Down II, supra note 12, at 231–44; Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at
90; Pachulski, supra note 10, at 944.
80
Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 90.
81
See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 11, at 746 (noting that the type of
transaction that gave rise to the absolute priority rule “is viewed as a conveyance
that, by preferring holders of equity interests over creditors, violates the payout
norms implicit in the debtor-creditor relation”).
82
See supra note 11.
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junior claimants without these creditors’ consent.83
By
prohibiting such conveyances, the absolute priority rule
“vindicate[s] the reasonable expectations formed by claimants
when their investments or loans were made”84 and mitigates “the
danger inherent in any reorganization plan proposed by a
debtor . . . that the plan will simply turn out to be too good a deal
for the debtor’s owners.”85 It likewise upholds the Bankruptcy
Code’s fundamental goal of ensuring that debtors provide for
creditors as much as possible through payment or other
property.86
The absolute priority rule also grants creditors, particularly
unsecured creditors,87 a crucial negotiation tool. Stripped of the
ability to demand that debtors treat them “fair and equitable” via
the absolute priority rule, unsecured creditors lose one of their
only and perhaps most valuable bargaining chips.88 Unsecured

83
But see Baird & Jackson, supra note 11, at 788–89 (arguing that “[o]ne of the
attractions of the Boyd rule at first meeting is that it appears to respond to a freezeout problem that neither non-bankruptcy law nor market sales can prevent,” but
that “the presence of owners junior to the residual owner [i.e., creditors] who would
have a right to assets of the firm in absence of default . . . does not require a special
set of rules”).
84
Falcon Capital Corp. S’holders v. Osborne (In re THC Fin. Corp.), 679 F.2d
784, 785 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting In re U.S. Fin., Inc., 648 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir.
1980)).
85
Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S.
434, 444 (1999).
86
See, e.g., Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 725 (2011) (noting
that one of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 was “to ensure that [debtors] repay creditors the maximum
they can afford” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, p. 2 (2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); United Savs. Assoc. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 808 F.2d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“A principal goal of the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code is to
benefit the creditors of the Chapter 11 debtor by preserving going-concern values
and thereby enhancing the amounts recovered by all creditors.”); Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 103 (1984) (theorizing that the foremost goal of
bankruptcy is to enhance creditors’ collection efforts); Warren, supra note 11, at 12–
13 (articulating “the principal reason for a reorganization” as “to enhance return to
the creditors and to increase the opportunity for reorganization of the business”).
87
Secured creditors have other negotiation tools at their disposal, such as the
§ 1111(b) election. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1111(b) (West 2011).
88
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp.
(In re Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp.), 282 B.R. 444, 453 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that creditors who are unable to assert the absolute priority rule are “in an
unusually disadvantaged negotiating position”); Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated
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creditors are less able to object to valuation of the debtor as a
going concern and to argue that going concern value is being
allocated—either explicitly or covertly—away from the unsecured
creditors to whom it belongs.89 This has the potential to skew the
loss allocation system embodied in the Bankruptcy Code and to
disrupt the baseline from which negotiations start and return
during a bankruptcy proceeding.90 Though this baseline affects
public companies and close corporations differently, it uniformly
thwarts attempts to divert value from senior claimants to junior
claimants—most typically owners—without the senior claimants’
consent.
A.

General Application to For-Profit Companies

As an initial matter, it is important to understand that the
going concern value of a reorganizing company is available for
If the
distribution to creditors before equity holders.91
reorganizing company instead were liquidated either through a
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor-in-possession or
trustee would sell the bankruptcy estate more or less piece-meal
and disburse any recovery according to the Bankruptcy Code’s
priority scheme.92 One of the main benefits of reorganization is
that reconstituting a company as a whole through a bankruptcy
proceeding plan may preserve value that likely would be lost
during a liquidation.93 As theorized by Professor Elizabeth

Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions,
36 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1038 (1987).
89
See Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1038 (“[T]he [fair and equitable] standard
permits the debtor to confirm a plan of reorganization and the owners to retain
control despite dissent of a class of creditors so long as the plan meets the applicable
financial test.”).
90
See id. at 1038–39 (noting that the fair and equitable standard “involve[s] loss
allocation” and that it “create[s] a baseline below which the debtor’s reorganization
plan cannot be taken”); Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditors’ Bargain: The
Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations,
19 BANKR. DEV. J. 287, 354 (2003) (“Bankruptcy is a legal forum for bargaining and
negotiation among various classes of investors in a financially distressed firm under
the auspices of a federal court.”).
91
The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy estate. This estate
becomes the legal and equitable owner of all property of the pre-bankruptcy
company, including “control and ownership of the business and its going-concern
value.” Warren, supra note 11, at 11.
92
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 507 (West 2011).
93
See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the fundamental goals of
bankruptcy); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (16th ed. 2010) ( “[C]ontinued
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Warren, when a court confirms the reorganizing debtor’s
bankruptcy plan, the entirety of the bankruptcy estate effectively
is “sold” to the post-reorganization company.94 This sale includes
the going concern value of the reorganized company, which
remains available for distribution to creditors prior to equity
holders.95
Three distinct entities take part in a reorganization: the prebankruptcy company, the bankruptcy estate, and the postreorganization company.96 These separate entities necessarily
are overseen by discrete management teams, even if the actual
individuals do not differ. As supervisors of the bankruptcy
estate, during the pendency of a Chapter 11 reorganization case,
management works to maximize the sale price of the
reorganizing company and then offers the resulting bundle of
real, personal, and intangible property held by the bankruptcy
estate to the owners of the post-reorganization company.97 The
price paid may take the form of debt satisfaction and other
contributions, but it nonetheless results in the postreorganization company’s purchasing the bankruptcy estate,
which includes control and ownership of the reorganized
company and the business’s going concern value.98 Because the
sale of the bankruptcy estate is governed by the Bankruptcy

operation can save the jobs of employees, the tax base of communities, and generally
reduce the upheaval that can result from termination of a business.”).
94
See Warren, supra note 11, at 11.
95
See id. at 11–12; Baird & Jackson, supra note 11, at 745 (“Where the firm
continues, the general creditors, but for the restructuring, might have something of
value that the restructuring takes away and gives to the shareholder. Even though
the firm will likely not be able to pay off the [creditors], the possibility that the firm
will do much better than expected makes the general creditors’ right to reach the
assets of the firm before the shareholders worth something.”).
96
The concept of three entities being involved in a reorganization is proposed by
Professor Warren: “The debtor gives way to the bankruptcy estate at the time of the
initial filing, the estate gives way to the post-bankruptcy entity on confirmation of a
plan, and the post-bankruptcy business survives the confirmation.” Warren, supra
note 11, at 12.
97
See id. at 12 (“The [debtor-in-possession] reshapes the business through
assumption and rejection of contracts, setting aside voidable preferences, dropping
unprofitable ventures and pursuing new business plans.”).
98
See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2006).
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Code’s priority scheme, unless the relevant parties agree
otherwise, distribution of the purchase price should go to
creditors ahead of equity holders and other junior claimants.99
Against this backdrop stands the absolute priority rule.
Because Chapter 11 and the absolute priority rule were designed
for larger companies with equity,100 in the typical for-profit
company case, the rule’s application is easily summarized:
A rule that prohibits old equity from retaining any interest in
the post-bankruptcy business on account of its earlier interest
in the pre-bankruptcy debtor simply restates the rules creating
the estate: upon filing, the bankruptcy estate owns all interests,
legal and equitable, of the pre-bankruptcy debtor. No one
retains any interest in property of the estate—not the secured
creditors, not the unsecured creditors, and not the old owners of
the estate. Creditors may file claims for payment and payout
from the estate which will be determined according to detailed
statutory provisions. Old owners may come back to claim
control only with the consent of creditors or if the creditors are
paid in full.
No legal rights carry through from any
relationships with the pre-bankruptcy debtor to relationships
with the post-bankruptcy company.101

Indeed, the absolute priority rule mirrors and thereby
supports the structure and principles of reorganization outlined
above. Given the unambiguous statutory mandate that senior
claimants be paid in full before junior claimants receive any
payment or property on account of their claims,102 combined with
courts’ interpretation of the term “interest” as specifically
referencing equity,103 courts universally apply the absolute
priority rule to for-profit companies and reject reorganization
plans which propose to allocate property to equity holders
without paying creditors in full.104 Questions as to the rule’s

99
See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 507, 1129(a) (West 2011); Baird & Jackson, supra note 11,
at 745 (“[The general creditors’] objection . . . goes to the shareholder’s recapture of
an interest in the firm . . . . [T]he general creditors should be able to object if the old
shareholder recovers something over which the general creditors have a prior claim
and does so by means of a transaction in which the general creditors have no
voice.”).
100
See Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1056.
101
Warren, supra note 11, at 13.
102
See supra note 11; 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b) (West 2011).
103
See supra note 16.
104
See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988)
(“Under current law, no Chapter 11 reorganization plan can be confirmed over the
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application predominantly arise when old equity holders seek to
retain an interest in the reorganized company without paying
creditors in full, but offer to contribute new capital to the
reorganized company. If old equity holders supply a “new” and
“substantial” contribution that is “necessary for an effective
reorganization,” “reasonably equivalent” in value to their
retained interest, and in the form of “money or money’s worth,”
courts generally will allow old equity holders to receive
ownership in the reorganized company.105 This scenario has
become known as the “new value exception” or “new value
corollary” to the absolute priority rule and has generated
scholarly debate principally around the existence of a true
“exception” and valuation of the contributed capital.106

creditors’ legitimate objections . . . if it fails to comply with the absolute priority
rule.”); In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507, 508–09 (3d Cir. 2005)
(upholding denial of plan confirmation where plan proposed to distribute warrants
to equity holders over the objection of a class of unsecured creditors not paid in full
pursuant to the plan); Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners v. BT/SAP Pool C Assocs.
(In re Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners), 138 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding
denial of plan confirmation where plan proposed to allow equity to retain interests in
the reorganized limited partnership and to pay unsecured creditors ten percent on
their claims); Liberty Nat’l Enters. v. Ambanc La Mesa Ltd. P’ship. (In re Ambanc
La Mesa Ltd. P’ship.), 115 F.3d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that partnership’s
proposed plan violated absolute priority rule where creditors were not paid in full
and equity holders retained interests in excess of contributions these holders made
to the reorganized partnership); In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 316, 322 (7th
Cir. 1994) (upholding finding that real estate limited partnership’s proposed plan
violated the absolute priority rule).
105
For a discussion of these criteria, see Ralph A. Peeples, Staying In: Chapter
11, Close Corporations and the Absolute Priority Rule, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 78–99
(1989) and Warren, supra note 11, at 43–44. For a discussion of the minority of
courts holding that this “exception” or “corollary” to the absolute priority rule did not
survive the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, see Warren, supra note 11, at 36,
39–40. Most recently, in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203
North LaSalle Street Partnership, the Supreme Court assumed that the “exception”
or “corollary” did survive the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, though the
Supreme Court declined to rule on the precise question. 526 U.S. 434, 435 (1999).
106
See, e.g., Adams, supra note 46, at 1450 (discussing how to ensure that equity
holders “contribute the fair market price for the interests they are retaining”);
Absolute Priority, supra note 11, at 124 (concluding that “a new value exception to
the absolute priority rule simply does not exist”); Warren, supra note 11, at 41
(arguing that the Bankruptcy Code allows equity to participate in a reorganized
debtor even if creditors have not been paid in full based upon the “bargain . . . old
equity proposes to purchase control of the post-reorganization business”); see also
203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 444–49 (discussing the history of the “ ‘new value
corollary’ (or ‘exception’)”).
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Specific Application to Close Corporations

Owners of close corporations often encounter problems with
the absolute priority rule and retaining interests in the
reorganized entity.107 Their interaction with the rule highlights
one side of the issues that arise when courts confront the
absolute priority rule in non-traditional contexts. As developed
in Part V of this Article, contrasting these dilemmas with the
impediments courts have found in applying the absolute priority
rule to nonprofits helps illustrate how the core tenets of the rule
are relevant to all nonprofit reorganizations.
To satisfy the absolute priority rule, either a reorganization
plan can give claimholders of the objecting class “property of a
value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed
amount of such claim,”108 or the plan proponent can demonstrate

107

Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), owners of sole proprietorships who filed Chapter
11 petitions as individual debtors also anticipated encountering similar problems
with the absolute priority rule as outlined in this sub-part. In BAPCPA, Congress
amended § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code—the absolute priority rule as
applicable to unsecured creditors—to provide that a plan of reorganization is fair
and equitable if “the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or
interest any property, except that in a case in which the debtor is an individual, the
debtor may retain property included in the estate under section 1115.” Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 321(c)(2), 119 Stat. 23, 95 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
(West 2011)) (emphasis added). As stated by one commentator: “it appears that
Congress intended the § 1129(b)(2) exception to ameliorate the harsh effects that the
absolute priority rule had on individual Chapter 11 debtors [, such as sole
proprietors,] by permitting the retention of certain property of the estate in
exchange for satisfying the § 1129(a)(15) requirement to pay future disposable
income or ‘sweat equity’ into the plan.” Michael P. Coury, Sweat Equity Redux: Does
the Absolute Priority Rule Survive for Individual Chapter 11 Cases?, NORTON
BANKR. L. ADVISER, Feb. 2011, at 1, 3.
Since the enactment of BAPCPA, courts addressing absolute priority claims in the
context of plans proposed by Chapter 11 individual debtors have produced split
decisions regarding whether Congress intended the complete abrogation of the
absolute priority rule for Chapter 11 individual debtors by way of this amendment.
Some courts hold that the rule does not apply to these debtors. See, e.g., In re Shat,
424 B.R. 854, 856 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010); In re Roedemeier, 374 B.R. 264, 276
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2007); In re Tegeder, 369 B.R. 477, 478 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007).
Other courts hold that § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s exception only includes property added to
the bankruptcy estate by § 1115 and, thus, the absolute priority rule applies to prepetition property. See, e.g., In re Mullins, 435 B.R. 352, 359–60 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
2010); In re Gelin, 437 B.R. 435, 442–43 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010); In re Gbadebo, 431
B.R. 222, 229–30 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010).
108
11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2011).
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that holders of junior claims or interests will not receive
anything under the plan.109 If a public company does not have
enough cash to pay the claims of an objecting class in full, the
company’s plan can provide that the debtor will issue and
distribute securities, such as stock, in the reorganized company
to fulfill the remainder of the claims. Equity holders can then
receive the same or other securities, thereby retaining interest in
the reorganized company.110
This distribution method, however, is unavailable to close
corporations, which cannot offer creditors a liquid ownership
stake in the reorganized company. Instead, owners of troubled
close corporations, who often are the directors and key employees
of these entities, must find a new source of “money or money’s
worth” to contribute to the reorganized entity if they want to
retain ownership of their business. The absolute priority rule,
notwithstanding the “new value exception,” prevents owners of
close corporations from reorganizing their businesses without the
consent of creditors more often than owners of public
companies.111
Courts and commentators have long lamented the divergent
results of the application of the same rule to different for-profit
entities.112 In particular, they point to the unique role owners
serve in close corporations, particularly limited partnerships and
other similar entities, and to the problems these owners face in
attracting investors.113 Taken together, they suggest that the

109

Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
See Peeples, supra note 105, at 76 (“Although difficult to value in advance,
the securities can at least be sold or traded by the holders of the claims. Thus, the
managers of a public company can avoid having to confront the danger of
eliminating the old equity owners.”).
111
Perhaps because of this result, empirical research demonstrates “that in
small business cases, the owner/operator tends to retain control through a
consensual plan while discharging some debt.” Warren, supra note 11, at 17.
112
Decades before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court
noted that the absolute priority rule had the potential to preclude reorganizing close
corporations from retaining the owners and managers best equipped to run the
reorganized entity. See Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117 (1939); In
re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash II), 72 F.3d 1305, 1314 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[I]n
recognition of the fact that prior owners may sometimes be the best ‘buyers’ of a
reorganized corporation, courts are reluctant to squeeze the old owners out
entirely.”); see also Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1068–81; Peeples, supra note 105, at
77.
113
See supra note 112; Warren, supra note 11, at 15–16.
110
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absolute priority rule be relaxed in these instances to allow
owners to retain an interest in—and thereby control of—the
reorganized entity even if creditors are not paid in full.114
For instance, commentators recommend that a “best efforts”
standard similar to that applicable to Chapter 12 and Chapter 13
proceedings be applied to close corporations and similar
entities.115 Owners could remain in control, but they would need
to use their “best efforts” to allocate all available funds to
repaying creditors. As with Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 plans,
this standard would balance the rights of creditors to payment
with the benefit of allowing those individuals best able to
increase payment to creditors to manage the reorganized
business.116 Moreover, application of the “best efforts” standard
seemingly would comport with the underlying tenets of the
absolute priority rule. Though old owners may retain an interest
in the reorganized business in order to maintain management
control, creditors would receive all going concern value of the
reorganized entity until they were paid in full before the old
owners could be allocated any value.117
Regardless, at present, unless the owners of close
corporations reach a consensual agreement with creditors, the
absolute priority rule operates and the owners may not retain an
interest in their reorganized businesses unless creditors are paid
in full or the owners contribute “money or money’s worth” equal
to their retained interest.118 As detailed in the next Part of this
Article, because nonprofit entities typically lack “owners” akin to
114

See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1050–51; Peeples, supra note 105, at 95.
See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1070–81; Peeples, supra note 105, at
103–07.
116
See Nimmer, supra note 88, at 1070 (“The ‘best effort’ model is a rule of
debtor protection based on equitable and financial effects. The rule benefits the
individual who makes an effort, but ensures that the creditors receive what is
realistically available from the debtor. It converts the creditor’s contract right to full
payment into a right to a best effort from the debtor to repay.”).
117
The main concerns with allowing owners to provide “value” to their
reorganized companies other than “money or money’s worth” are (1) that other types
of “value,” such as labor and managerial skills, are difficult to quantify; (2) that if
creditors wanted the owners to remain in control, they would strike a deal with
them, and courts should not upset the creditors’ decision; and (3) that the unique
position and insider status of owners of close corporations and similar entities afford
them too great an ability to depress or skew the going concern value of the
reorganized entity. See, e.g., Wabash II, 72 F.3d at 1314; Warren, supra note 11, at
17–18.
118
See supra note 111.
115
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for-profit entities’ equity holders, the few courts that have
addressed how the absolute priority rule applies to nonprofits
hold that the rule generally is presumptively satisfied, or in the
limited circumstances in which it is not, that it applies only when
the nonprofit’s structure essentially transforms the nonprofit into
a for-profit for purposes of the rule.119 Consequently, in contrast
to a close corporation’s owners, who direct and manage the
business, current case law potentially allows a nonprofit’s
directors, managers, and members to retain control of the
nonprofit post-reorganization without a clear requirement that a
nonprofit’s plan provide as much payment as possible to creditors
until creditors are paid in full.
III. THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE’S CURRENT APPLICATION TO
NONPROFIT ENTITIES
The few courts that have decided absolute priority claims in
nonprofit bankruptcies overall hold that the absolute priority
rule is categorically satisfied by nonprofit entities, except in
limited circumstances, even if the nonprofit had members and
those members, along with the nonprofit’s managers and
directors, retained control of the reorganized nonprofit. In
arriving at this conclusion, these courts engaged in a fact-specific
analysis of the membership and control structure of the nonprofit
at issue, often trying to squeeze the nonprofit into the inapposite
framework of Chapter 11’s plan confirmation provisions, and
sometimes criticizing their inability to apply a key creditor
protection to the plan at hand. Many of these cases lack an
analysis of the retention of going-concern value by managers,
directors, members, or the nonprofit itself, value which owners
and the entity would not be allowed to retain if the nonprofit was
structured more like a for-profit entity.
There are three main cases addressing absolute priority
claims in nonprofit bankruptcies. The first court to opine on the
issue was the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine in
1991.120 A rural electric cooperative filed a Chapter 11 petition
119
Courts often find that the absolute priority rule is categorically satisfied in
nonprofit reorganizations, which is another way of saying that analysis of the rule is
unnecessary and that the rule does not apply.
120
In re E. Me. Electric Coop., Inc., 125 B.R. 329 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991). The first
court to mention the issue was the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan in 1985. A life-care facility for the elderly filed a Chapter 11 petition and
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after making a financially burdensome investment.121 Similar to
other utility cooperatives, the cooperative allocated “patronage
stock” to its members.122 The cooperative’s proposed plan sought
to pay those members holding patronage stock a pro rata share of
approximately $200,000 on account of the stock and a percentage
return on their membership fees, and to pay unsecured creditors
less than the full amount of their claims.123 Certain unsecured
creditors objected to the accompanying disclosure statement,
arguing that payment on account of the stock and fees violated
the absolute priority rule.124
After reviewing the statute under which the cooperative was
organized and the function of patronage stock, the court
concluded that the stock constituted the equivalent of an
ownership interest in the cooperative substantively distinct from,
and thus junior to, debt and unsecured claims.125 Accordingly,

certain bondholders moved to lift the automatic stay. In re Independence Vill., Inc.,
52 B.R. 715 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985). In support of their motion, the bondholders
argued that the facility was so insolvent that it could not reorganize. Id. at 726. The
court found the argument “unpersuasive”: “[The debtor] is a non-profit corporation.
It has no shareholders, hence there are no interests inferior to the unsecured
creditors. Thus there should be little difficulty with the absolute priority rule . . . .
Thus a severe cramdown of unsecured debt may not be an insurmountable problem
in a plan of reorganization.” Id. (citations omitted).
121
In re E. Me. Electric Coop., 125 B.R. at 331.
122
Id. at 332. Patronage stock—also called “patronage capital”—refers to a
portion of excess revenues of a utility that is collected by the cooperative to smooth
fluctuations in its expenses: “Because of the difficulty of anticipating exactly what
the costs of producing power will be, utilities sometimes collect excess revenues . . . .
Patronage capital . . . refers to a portion of this excess revenue which [the
cooperative’s bylaws] allow it to retain in order to cover fluctuations in production
costs and to make capital expenditures without having first to raise rates and
accumulate the necessary funds.” Wabash II, 72 F.3d at 1315–16. The cooperative
eventually must repay these excess revenues to members. Thus, the cooperative’s
bylaws provide that members are allocated patronage stock according to their
respective purchases of energy. The cooperative’s board determines the timing of
repayment on the patronage stock at their discretion, similar to the payment of
dividends in a for-profit corporation. See id. at 1316; In re E. Me. Electric Coop., 125
B.R. at 332.
123
In re E. Me. Electric Coop., 125 B.R. at 331–32.
124
Id. at 334.
125
Id. at 339. The court predominately focused on the fact that repayment of the
patronage stock was at the discretion of the cooperative’s directors, which made the
patronage stock distinct from “claims [that] have one feature in common: there
exists or may come to exist a set of facts, capable of proof, that will require the
debtor to encounter liability, whether it chooses to do so or not.” Id. at 338 n.42. In
contrast, “allocated patronage capital the directors have not voted to retire remains
an ownership interest.” Id. at 339.
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the court held that the absolute priority rule precluded members
from receiving property or payment on account of the stock
unless creditors were satisfied in full,126 declared the proposed
plan unconfirmable, and disapproved the disclosure statement.127
Though a nonprofit, the cooperative’s governing statute and
documents allowed the court to transform the cooperative’s
members into the equivalent of for-profit equity holders for the
purposes of the absolute priority rule, creating one of the limited
circumstances in which the rule is not categorically satisfied by—
or inapplicable to—a nonprofit. The proposed plan sought to pay
the cooperative’s equivalent of equity holders ahead of unsecured
creditors, giving them money that belonged to unsecured
creditors, and the court appropriately rejected the scheme.
Several months later, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Indiana found that the absolute priority rule
was satisfied, via its inapplicability,128 by a plan put forth by
another struggling electric cooperative with similar “patronage
capital.”129 The plan provided that unsecured claims would not
be paid in full and that the cooperative’s members would retain
Certain creditors
control of the reorganized nonprofit.130
objected, citing the absolute priority rule. The court rejected
their argument, finding that an “equity interest” necessary for
the rule’s application included two attributes—control and
sharing in profits—the second of which was not inherent in
members’ patronage capital because applicable state law
required any surplus upon liquidation to be escheated to the
state.
This escheatment precluded members from “any
profiteering at the creditors’ expense.”131 The court further noted
that the plan “satisfies the economic underpinnings of the

126

Id. at 339.
Id. at 339–40. The court also held that members did not have any interest in
their membership fees and, thus, no claim for repayment: “Again, proposing any
distribution on account of such claims with neither consent nor full payment of
senior claims creates an unconfirmable plan.” Id. at 339.
128
See infra note 133.
129
In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash I), No. 85-2238-RWV-11, 1991 WL
11004220, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 1991).
130
Id. at *3.
131
Id. at *60.
127
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absolute priority rule because it converts every piece of economic
property in [the cooperative] into cash to be paid to its
creditors.”132
On appeal,133 the Seventh Circuit upheld the bankruptcy
court’s ruling, identifying three components of an “equity
interest”—control, profit share, and ownership of corporate
assets—and similarly highlighting the cooperative’s inability to
pay profits to members in finding that the plan did not violate
the absolute priority rule.134 Focusing also on the control
component of an “equity interest,” the Seventh Circuit analyzed
the effect of members’ retention of control of the reorganized
cooperative both on the application of the absolute priority rule
and, more cursorily, on the fairness of the proposed plan. It
concluded that control alone did not amount to an “equity
interest”135 and that members’ control was necessary and

132
Id. This statement demonstrates that though the court technically found the
absolute priority rule satisfied, it substantively found the rule inapplicable to the
cooperative: if the absolute priority rule operated, the court would have had no need
to state explicitly that its core tenets were satisfied. Also, as discussed below, on
appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court’s conclusion. See infra
notes 135–138 and accompanying text. Later, in confirming a labor union’s
reorganization plan, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California
characterized the Seventh Circuit’s ruling as holding “that the Absolute Priority
Rule did not apply under such circumstances.” In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen
& Helpers Union Local 890, 225 B.R. 719, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998).
133
During the interim years, two more bankruptcy courts encountered absolute
priority objections in the context of nonprofit reorganization. First, in In re
Whittaker Memorial Hospital Ass’n, , the debtor hospital nonstock, membership
corporation proposed to pay certain creditors less than the full amount of their
claims while allowing “a junior class of creditors” to remain in control without
contributing new value. 149 B.R. 812, 815 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993). The court held
that the plan did not violate the absolute priority rule because “retaining control
over the debtor entity” did not give the junior class “anything” and “nothing beyond
control . . . passe[d] to it.” Id. at 816.
Second, and in contrast, in In re S.A.B.T.C. Townhouse Ass’n, the debtor nonprofit
corporation homeowners’ association proposed to pay unsecured creditors a portion
of the full amount of their claims and to allow association members to retain their
interests in the reorganized nonprofit. 152 B.R. 1005, 1008 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
Without any analysis, the court assumed that the members’ interests were
“interests” subject to the absolute priority rule and then proceeded to analyze
whether the members had contributed “new value.” Id. at 1008–11. Because the
court found that the members had not contributed “new value,” it held that the plan
violated the absolute priority rule. Id. at 1011.
134
In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n (Wabash II), 72 F.3d 1305, 1315–18 (7th
Cir. 1995).
135
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important.136 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that the
cooperative’s plan, mainly because it allowed its members—for
whom the cooperative was created and to whom the cooperative
was most valuable—to remain in control, maximized the going
concern value of the reorganized nonprofit and, most
importantly, allocated that value to the cooperative’s creditors.137
Regardless of whether the absolute priority rule was
categorically satisfied—or inapplicable—the plan still met the
underlying goals of the rule and was “fair and equitable” to
creditors who were saddled with the same “owners” despite not
being paid in full.
Six years later,138 in 2001, the Ninth Circuit published the
next—and last—major decision regarding the absolute priority
rule’s application to nonprofit entities.139 A local labor union
affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(“International”) and the Teamsters Joint Council No. 7 (“JC7”)
The mere fact that the [members of the cooperative] are benefited by [the
cooperative]’s operation and might be disadvantaged by its demise also
does not give them an ‘interest’ cognizable in bankruptcy. Employees,
managers and customers, among others, always have an interest, in the
broadest sense, in a corporation. The factor which distinguishes these
parties from stockholders is not ‘control’ per se (managers, after all, have at
least a limited control) but the ability to make use of that control to
generate profits or to increase their own share of profits.
Id. at 1318–19.
136
Id. at 1318 (“[S]ince [the cooperative] was specifically designed to supply its
own Members, their continuation as customers in control of [the cooperative] is a
means of maximizing the value of the estate for the benefit of creditors.”).
137
Id. at 1312–13 (“The value of [the cooperative] to its Members exceeds its
value to any third-party buyer because [the cooperative] is tailored exactly to the
Members’ requirements . . . . The bankruptcy court found that the [cooperative’s
proposed plan] provided the maximum amount that [creditors] could possibly obtain.
It met the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) and was confirmable.”).
138
In the interim, one more court published an opinion addressing the absolute
priority rule’s application to nonprofit entities. In Southern Pacific Transportation
Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., a nonprofit agricultural cooperative
proposed a plan that would pay holders of patronage stock while paying
approximately 19% on unsecured claims. 252 B.R. 373, 385 (E.D. Tex. 2000). Relying
on Wabash II, the cooperative argued that the patronage stock should be
characterized as debt. The court held that the plan violated the absolute priority
rule, finding that the patronage stock should be classified as equity based upon an
analysis of governing state law. Id. at 388–89. Ultimately, the court remanded the
case to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the new value exception was
satisfied. Id. at 390.
139
Sec. Farms v. Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890
(In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890), 265 F.3d 869
(9th Cir. 2001).
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submitted a plan of reorganization that proposed to distribute to
creditors an amount equal to the equity in the debtor’s real and
tangible personal property financed through the reorganized
union’s borrowing against these assets.140 The plan further
provided that any gain from a sale or refinancing of these assets
during the five years post-confirmation would be distributed to
unsecured creditors.141 Certain unsecured creditors objected to
the plan, contending that the reorganized union should raise
member dues and/or terminate the union’s affiliations with
International and JC7, thereby eliminating the cooperative’s “per
capita tax” obligations to them, in order to increase the amount
paid to unsecured creditors.142
These creditors additionally argued that the plan violated
the absolute priority rule because the union would continue to
exist and own its property without paying unsecured creditors in
full.143
As clarified on appeal, they also maintained that
International had an equity interest in the union by way of a
provision in its contract with the union that escheated the
union’s assets to International upon the union’s liquidation.144
The union’s plan distributed property to International on account
of its secured and unsecured claims; if International received this
property, the objecting creditors insisted that International
provide new value.145
In addressing the absolute priority rule arguments, the
bankruptcy court began by noting that
[i]n the case of a Chapter 11 debtor that is a corporation or
partnership, the Absolute Priority Rule prevents the
shareholders or partners from receiving anything on account of

140
In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 890, 225 B.R.
719, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998).
141
Id.
142
Id. “Per capita tax” is the per-member portion of a local labor union’s dues
that it must remit to the national or international “parent” unions with which it
affiliates. Severing ties with International and JC7 would have saved the
cooperative $6.50 per member per month. Id. at 724. The bankruptcy court, and
later the Ninth Circuit, considered this an argument that the plan was not proposed
in good faith in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3). In re Gen. Teamsters, 265 F.3d at
877; In re Gen. Teamsters, 225 B.R. at 722.
143
In re Gen. Teamsters, 225 B.R. at 735.
144
In re Gen. Teamsters, 265 F.3d at 872; see also In re Gen. Teamsters, 225 B.R.
at 736.
145
In re Gen. Teamsters, 265 F.3d at 872.
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their interests in the corporation or partnership, and from
retaining the benefits of such interests, unless all creditors have
been paid in full . . . .146

The bankruptcy court then confirmed that the union “is an
unincorporated nonprofit association . . . whose members have no
ownership interest in [the union] akin to that of shareholders of a
corporation or partners of a partnership”147 and that the plan did
not provide that International would “receive or retain anything
‘on account of’ its escheat rights . . . .”148 After discussing the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the bankruptcy court concluded that
the absolute priority rule did not apply to the union’s plan.149 In
dicta, however, it lamented the uneasy fit of “traditional
bankruptcy analysis” to nonprofit reorganizations, expressly
noting that the absolute priority rule’s inapplicability to the
union’s plan seemed to contradict the fact that the union’s
members benefited most from the reorganization.150
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld that bankruptcy court’s
ruling. In addressing the dissenting creditors’ absolute priority
rule arguments, similar to the bankruptcy court, the Ninth
Circuit discussed the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, noting parallels
and further distinguishing the union from for-profit entities
based on the principles of local labor unions and their connection
with their affiliates that made the local union financially
independent from its affiliates.151 The Ninth Circuit also found
146

In re Gen. Teamsters, 225 B.R. at 736.
Id.
148
Id. The bankruptcy court further found that the plan “provides for
[International] merely to the extent that [International] holds a creditor’s claim.” Id.
149
“In this case, neither [the union]’s members nor [the union]’s affiliates nor
anyone else holds any interest in [the union], as that concept is defined by the
Bankruptcy Code and case law. The Absolute Priority Rule does not, by its terms,
prohibit a debtor entity from retaining its own assets, and cannot, by its terms,
apply to a situation such as this where the debtor has no equity security holders.” Id.
at 737.
150
Id. Specifically, the bankruptcy court noted the union’s case “presents a
somewhat anomalous situation whereby [the union]’s members are not the
proponents of the Plan . . . yet the dues they pay are [the union]’s only source of
income and the amount of such dues is determined solely by the members—thus, the
Absolute Priority Rule cannot be applied . . . even though [the members] will reap
the benefits of reorganization.” Id. The bankruptcy court also determined that the
plan was proposed in good faith despite not seeking to raise member dues or
terminate the union’s affiliations. Id. at 738.
151
“If the International were to be regarded as an equity owner . . . then the
International’s unwillingness or inability to contribute a sufficient value to ensure
the [local union]’s reorganization would force the liquidation of the [local union].
147
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that International’s escheatment right was so uncertain and
remote that it did not have any immediate ownership right in the
union and, likewise, that the union’s members did not have any
ownership right in the union.152 Accordingly, none of the three
indices of an “equity interest” identified by the Seventh Circuit—
control, profit share, and ownership of corporate assets—were
present for either International or the union’s members, and the
absolute priority rule did not apply to the union’s plan.153
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the closest the
Ninth Circuit came to discussing whether the plan was “fair and
equitable” notwithstanding the inapplicability of the absolute
priority rule was its discussion of the dissenting creditors’
argument that the plan should have raised member dues and/or
terminated the local union’s affiliations. In upholding the
bankruptcy court’s determination that the plan was filed in good
faith despite these omissions, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
bankruptcy court had found that “the plan represented the
[union]’s honest effort to satisfy the demands of its creditors.”154
The Ninth Circuit, however, did not link this finding to a broader
examination of the fair and equitable standard.

This would in turn destroy the federally protected rights of the workers represented
by the [local union] in the collective bargaining process . . . . As a consequence of this
distinction between local and international unions, the [local union] is financially
independent.” Sec. Farms v. Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union,
Local 890 (In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890), 265
F.3d 869, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001).
152
Id. at 876.
153
Id. The Ninth Circuit did not explicitly state whether the absolute priority
rule was inapplicable or satisfied. In discussing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion,
however, the Ninth Circuit did state that “[i]n the labor [union] context, the absolute
priority rule makes even less sense than it did in the electric utility context . . . .” Id.
at 874. This statement suggests that the Ninth Circuit considered the rule to be
inapplicable.
154
Id. at 877.
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Taken together, these three main cases155 demonstrate
courts’ reasoning in holding the absolute priority rule generally
inapplicable to nonprofit reorganizations. Given the express
language of the absolute priority rule as codified in the
Bankruptcy Code,156 coupled with courts’ narrow reading of the
term “interest,”157 this conclusion seems correct. The absolute
priority rule, as written expressly and specifically into the
Bankruptcy Code’s fair and equitable standard, normally does
not apply to nonprofits because nonprofits do not have “interest”
holders with characteristics equivalent to for-profit’s equity
holders.
Notably missing by and large from these opinions,
particularly the Ninth Circuit’s opinion,158 however, is the
recognition that the absolute priority rule is only one facet of the
fair and equitable standard.
In not acknowledging the
connection between the absolute priority rule and the fair and
equitable standard, these courts have created case law that may
be read to provide that a nonprofit’s reorganization plan need not

155
Since the Ninth Circuit’s decision, two more courts have addressed the
absolute priority rule in the context of nonprofit reorganizations. First, in In re
Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, a “nonprofit public benefit corporation”
that owned and operated a hospital sought a three-month extension of its exclusive
period, as debtor-in-possession, to file a plan of reorganization. 282 B.R. 444, 446
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002). The official committee of unsecured creditors objected, stating
that “unsecured creditors should be allowed to protect themselves by proposing
competing plans because the nonprofit status of the Hospital blunts the force of the
absolute priority rule, which usually affords creditors leverage to block plans that
give value to owners.” Id. at 447. The court acknowledged the validity of the
argument, stating that the hospital’s unsecured creditors were in a “take-it-or-leave
dilemma” that counseled against extending exclusivity because the unsecured
creditors had the most incentive to propose a plan that increased the going concern
value of the hospital as “every additional dollar is their money.” Id. at 453.
Second, in In re Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc., a certain creditor argued
that the debtor citizen action group non-profit charitable organization’s
reorganization plan should not be approved because it violated the absolute priority
rule. 388 B.R. 202, 209, 244–45 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d, 632 F.3d 168 (5th Cir.
2011). The court disagreed, simply stating that the debtor’s “Plan does not provide
for equity holders to receive or retain an interest, because the Debtor, as a non-profit
organization, has no equity holders.” Id. at 245.
156
See supra note 11.
157
See supra note 16.
158
For example, in discussing the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the Ninth Circuit
stated that “[i]n the labor relations context, the absolute priority rule makes even
less sense than it did in the electric utility context . . . .” Sec. Farms v. Gen.
Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890 (In re Gen. Teamsters,
Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890), 265 F.3d 869, 874 (9th Cir. 2001).
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allocate going concern value of the debtor nonprofit to creditors
until they are paid in full before that value is accessible to prepetition interest holders who resemble a for-profit’s owners—or
the nonprofit itself—simply because the absolute priority rule, as
explicitly codified, is inapplicable. Though justifiable reasons
may exist for such deviations—as developed in Part VI—these
courts offered no explanation for the potential departure.
Moreover, the absolute priority rule has a fuller history than
these courts have credited it—a history that directly links the
fair and equitable standard and the absolute priority rule.159
Those few courts able to transform the nonprofit’s members into
the equivalent of equity holders unintentionally take advantage
of this history, grant creditors the baseline protections and
bargaining position that Chapter 11 assumes them to have, and
confirm reorganization plans that fully satisfy the requirements
of Chapter 11. Indeed, all of the main cases dealing with
absolute priority claims in the context of nonprofit
reorganizations involved nonprofits with members. Not all
nonprofits have members, which may appear to make the
absolute priority rule even less applicable to such nonprofits.
The next part of this Article develops a theory of how the
absolute priority rule, by way of its history and core principles,
applies to all reorganizing nonprofits, regardless of whether a
nonprofit has members or whether those members resemble forprofit equity holders.
IV. EXTENDING THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE
A.

Theory

As recognized in varying degrees by those courts addressing
absolute priority rule objections in the context of nonprofit
reorganizations, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code must be
made to fit these reorganizations. One critical mandate of
Chapter 11’s plan confirmation requirements is that all
distributable going concern value of the reorganizing debtor be
allocated to creditors until they are paid in full. Because of the
way in which the Bankruptcy Code codifies this mandate in the
absolute priority rule, explicitly stating that only once creditors

159
See supra Part II.B (discussing the statutory codification of the fair and
equitable standard and absolute priority rule).
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are paid in full can the debtor’s equity holders retain any value,
courts overall have thought themselves forced to hold that the
absolute priority rule—and, with it, possibly its mandate—does
not apply to reorganizing nonprofits.
Nevertheless, the absolute priority rule is less about the
debtor’s equity holders retaining value and more about ensuring
that a plan of reorganization provides for creditors to the greatest
extent possible. What bankruptcy practitioners now know as the
absolute priority rule originally was the directive developed in
case law addressing a situation more analogous to nonprofit
reorganizations than one would think.
Railroads’ owners
attempted to rid their railroads of unsecured debt while retaining
ownership and control.160 Upon being presented with such
schemes, the Supreme Court made three key holdings: (1) that
all assets of a debtor railroad were held in trust first for the
payment of the debtor’s creditors;161 (2) that, accordingly,
property of the old railroad obtained by the new railroad was
property from which creditors were entitled to be paid before
owners “could retain it for any purpose whatever,” including for
the purpose of control;162 and (3) that creditors of railroads in
particular must not be passed over because railroads were
“[in]strument[s] of public service.”163
Two fundamental rules of reorganization emerge from these
foundational cases: the going concern value of a reorganizing
debtor belongs to the reorganized entity; and the reorganized
entity must allocate as much of that value as possible to the
debtor’s creditors. These rules possibly gain additional vitality if
the reorganizing entity serves the public in some capacity—such
as in the context of nonprofits, which almost by definition
predominately serve the public.164 Just as the railroad’s owners
were not allowed to discharge their unsecured debt while
retaining ownership and control, a nonprofit should not be able to

160

See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
162
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913); see supra notes 48–49 and
accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court stated that if there was enough
value in the railroad to justify issuing new stock, then the railroad’s “creditors were
entitled to the benefit of that value, whether it was present or prospective, for
dividends or only for purposes of control,” until creditors were paid in full).
163
Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 682 (1899);
see supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
164
See supra note 1 (defining nonprofit).
161
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continue in existence without paying its creditors as much as
possible purely by reorganizing. And just as with railroads, the
“peculiar character”165 of nonprofits, especially in relation to the
Bankruptcy Code, demands that creditors receive the greatest
possible amount of the nonprofit’s going concern value.
Statutory codification of these rules did not alter them.
Congress wrote the characterization of the Supreme Court’s
holdings as demanding that creditors receive a “fair offer” into
the Bankruptcy Act as the requirement that a plan be “fair and
equitable.”166 After codification, the Supreme Court confirmed
that “fair and equitable” encompassed the absolute priority rule
as it is thought of today,167 evidencing that the fundamental rules
developed by case law extend beyond the for-profit context of
railroad reorganizations covered by the absolute priority rule.
For example, in a case decided soon after “fair and equitable” was
added to the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
a debtor’s creditors have “full right of priority” to the debtor’s
assets.168
Then, in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, after protracted
debate and numerous drafts, Congress specifically separated the
absolute priority rule from “fair and equitable,” making it a subpart of the standard.169 Throughout all of Congress’s drafts, the
absolute priority rule remained an explicitly or implicitly
necessary, but not sufficient, part of the standard.170 And despite
recommendations that a reorganizing debtor’s going concern
value be allocated away from creditors irrespective of whether
they were paid in full,171 Congress made certain that railroad
reorganizations’ fundamental rules survived. For example, in
commenting on one of its drafts, the House identified the rule
that all going concern value of a reorganizing debtor be allocated
165

Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. at 682.
See supra notes 52–59.
167
See supra notes 56 & 60.
168
Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122 (1939) (quoting Kan. City
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 456 (1926). The entire
quotation reads: “Whenever assessments are demanded, they must be adjusted with
the purpose of according to the creditor his full right of priority against the corporate
assets, so far as possible in the existing circumstances.” Id.
169
See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
170
See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
171
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the COMM’N. ON THE
BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2 (1973)).
166
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first to creditors as one of its guiding principles.172 Similarly, by
not listing numerous examples of what satisfied the fair and
equitable standard, Congress created a statute with an “open
texture” that invites courts to rely on legislative history and case
law to evaluate a reorganization plan,173 necessarily leading
courts to look to the fundamental rules that emerge from the
railroad reorganization cases.174
The survival of the two fundamental rules through statutory
codification makes sense. These rules comport with the primary
structure and principles of reorganization. When compared to
the railroads’ equity receiverships, Chapter 11 reorganization
adds an intermediate party—the debtor-in-possession.175
Chapter 11 delegates the responsibilities of the reorganized
entity to the old entity’s creditors to the debtor-in-possession.
First, as all going concern value of a debtor is available for
distribution to creditors before equity holders during liquidation,
when a debtor reorganizes, that going concern value must remain
available for distribution to creditors before it can be accessed by
equity holders.176 Second, the reorganizing debtor—by way of the
debtor-in-possession—thus has an obligation to propose a plan
that provides for creditors to the greatest extent possible before
allocating any going concern value elsewhere.177
The absolute priority rule mirrors this structure in the
context of a for-profit reorganization and, accordingly, requires
that creditors be paid in full before equity holders receive any
property or payment. The rule frames the reorganizing debtor’s
172

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
174
For instance, in a recent decision addressing the absolute priority rule, the
Second Circuit discussed and relied upon railroad reorganization cases in deciding
that senior creditors’ “gifting” of shares and warrants to a junior class, although a
more senior class did not approve the plan and were not paid in full, violated the
absolute priority rule. Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N.
Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011).
175
See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the three distinct
entities that take part in a reorganization).
176
See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
177
See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. The debtor-in-possession also
must take into consideration other interested parties in the reorganization, such as
employees. This obligation, however, most often should not require the diversion of
going concern value otherwise available to creditors because a debtor-in-possession’s
duty to other parties involves the same considerations implicated in reconstituting
the debtor as a viable business post-reorganization. For example, in renewing an
ailing business, the debtor-in-possession will preserve jobs.
173
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obligation to creditors this way because the rule was crafted only
considering for-profit entities. Even if Congress did not explicitly
codify the absolute priority rule in the Bankruptcy Code, merely
leaving the Bankruptcy Act’s “fair and equitable” wording intact,
none of the courts subsequently applying the rule to for-profit
reorganizations should have arrived at different results than if
the courts evaluated the instant plans for their fairness and
equitableness.
Equity holders of for-profit entities are the residual owners
of and ultimately control for-profit entities. They own all excess
going concern value, and they rightly should not allow any of that
value to be allocated elsewhere—such as to expand the
operations of the reorganized entity—without their consent.
Indeed, as identified by courts addressing the absolute priority
rule as applicable to nonprofits, control is a critical hallmark of
ownership.178 Because of this control, when a for-profit entity
reorganizes, the threat that equity holders will take too much for
themselves looms.
Given that creditors are entitled to a
reorganizing debtor’s assets before equity, absent the explicitly
codified absolute priority rule, courts still would have been
obligated to reject plans which proposed to allocate property to
equity holders without paying creditors in full.
As concerns the absolute priority rule and fair and equitable
standard, there is one relevant difference between for-profit and
nonprofit entities: most nonprofits lack the equivalent of equity
holders who ultimately direct management’s and the board’s
business decisions and hold the for-profit accountable if
management and the board attempts to allocate going concern
value without the equity holders’ approval. Instead, a nonprofit’s
managers, board, and, if applicable, members fill the role of the
for-profits’ owners, both directing the day-to-day business of the
nonprofit and making larger decisions regarding its continued
operation. In some cases, managers and board oversee the
nonprofit at the discretion of state or municipal officials.179 In
other cases, even if a nonprofit has members, members have

178

See supra notes 131 & 153 and accompanying text.
For example, the board of directors of the non-profit Las Vegas Monorail
Corporation is appointed by the governor of the State of Nevada. History, LAS VEGAS
MONORAIL, http://www.lvmonorail.com/about/history (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
179
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little control over the nonprofit.180 Thus, in the case of some
nonprofits, it can be argued that the state, municipality, or part
of society that benefits from the continued operation of a
nonprofit is the true “owner” of the nonprofit. Regardless of
whether managers, directors, members, or the ultimate overseers
of a nonprofit hold “interests” in the nonprofit, they become the
“owners” for the purposes of the absolute priority rule and the
fair and equitable standard. Any property that a reorganized
nonprofit keeps for itself through its reorganization—and thus
keeps for its managers, directors, members, or broadly for the
benefit of society—is property that may be allocable to its
creditors.
To determine whether a reorganizing nonprofit is assigning
going concern value to itself that should go to creditors, a court
merely needs to apply the two fundamental rules that animate
the fair and equitable standard and the absolute priority rule.
First, all going concern value of the reorganizing nonprofit not
necessary to the restructuring is available, first and foremost, to
its creditors.181
As with for-profit reorganizations, the
reorganized nonprofit essentially purchases the old nonprofit for
its going concern value. The reorganized nonprofit consequently
continues the operations of the old nonprofit. Second, if the going
concern value is less than the amount the old nonprofit owed to
creditors, the reorganized nonprofit must pay this value to those
creditors. Unless a nonprofit has members equivalent to equity
holders whose “interests” it wants to discharge through
reorganization, the going concern value almost always should be
less than creditors’ claims. Otherwise the nonprofit need not
reorganize. Hence, stated generally, if the reorganizing nonprofit
proposes to preserve going concern value for itself, the nonprofit’s
proposed plan does not fulfill the underlying principles of the
absolute priority rule and is not fair and equitable.
Such a scheme should be readily apparent. The plan may
reserve a sum for capital expenditures in excess of the nonprofit’s
historical major expenditures, provide for salary increases at a
rate not at the level of previous increases, or decrease member
dues. In these scenarios, not only does the reorganized nonprofit
180
For example, many private schools are nonprofit entities. Parents constitute
the members and hold shares in the nonprofit, but a board of trustees ultimately
oversees the school.
181
See supra notes 131 & 153 and accompanying text.
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survive, but it also benefits from the discharge of its debt, exactly
as the railroads’ owners attempted to benefit from equity
receiverships. As dictated by the principles underlying the
absolute priority rule, if the nonprofit decides to take advantage
of reorganization pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, the
nonprofit’s creditors must be paid in full before the nonprofit can
better itself. If not, management and members will be allowed to
take advantage of their insider status and usher through a plan
that is simply too good a deal for the nonprofit and themselves.
The parallel between the application of the principles
underlying the absolute priority rule to for-profit and nonprofit
entities is most evident when nonprofits are compared to close
corporations. Managers, directors, and members of nonprofits
strongly resemble owners of close corporations. These owners
direct the day-to-day business of their company and have the
final say on larger decisions regarding its continued operation.
Unlike managers, directors, and members of nonprofits, however,
owners of close corporations who cannot find a source of new
money to contribute to their reorganizing companies are unable
to retain control of their companies absent creditor consent.182
Despite the many benefits these owners may bring to their
reorganized companies, courts strictly apply the absolute priority
rule to their proposed plans, preventing owners who do not
contribute new value from retaining any interest unless creditors
are paid in full.183
This result starkly contrasts with nonprofit reorganizations.
Because a nonprofit’s managers, directors, and, if applicable,
members do not hold traditional ownership stakes in the
nonprofit, they may continue directing the nonprofit’s operations
post-reorganization without contributing to the reorganization in
the same way owners of a close corporation are required to
contribute. Indeed, in one of the three main cases dealing with
nonprofit reorganization and the absolute priority rule, the
Seventh Circuit even lauded the continued involvement of
nonprofits’ members in the reorganized nonprofit, stating that
allowing members to stay in control maximized the going concern
value of the nonprofit.184 In the context of reorganization of close

182
183
184

See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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corporations, a court would not credit this kind of intangible
benefit accruing from management’s involvement in the
reorganized business to owners who also managed the business.
If these owner-managers want to reorganize and remain in
control, they must contribute new capital to the reorganized
business.185 Thus, if nonprofits were close corporations—which,
given their size and management structure, many of them
essentially are186—they would not be reorganizing at all.
If the directives of the absolute priority rule do not apply to
reorganizing nonprofits, not only will a nonprofit’s managers,
directors, and members be allowed to retain control of their
nonprofit despite not having to contribute new capital, creating
even more division in how the fair and equitable standard is
applied to different types of reorganizing entities,187 but also they
may be able to direct old capital and future revenues—that is,
going concern value—to the reorganized nonprofit for them to use
for the betterment of the nonprofit. Such a result contradicts the
core of the absolute priority rule. Nonprofits cannot subordinate
the claims of their creditors to the benefit of their continued
operation.
In the end, it does not matter whether management or
equity holders are viewed as the “owners” for the purposes of the
principles underlying the absolute priority rule.
If the
reorganizing entity proposes a plan that violates the payment
priority structure among creditors and interest holders,
allocating going concern value away from senior claimants, to
equity holders or simply to itself, the plan is not fair and
equitable. This is the principle that courts addressing absolute
priority claims in the context of nonprofit reorganizations only
marginally acknowledged or completely overlooked. And this is
the principle that animates the absolute priority rule and
warrants its application to all nonprofit reorganizations.
Regardless of case law that may be read to provide otherwise,
unless creditors consent, a plan of reorganization, whether
185

See supra notes 113 & 118 and accompanying text.
For example, Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc., a nonprofit that sues
municipalities and developers regarding the use of an aquifer in Texas, filed its
Chapter 11 petition as a small business debtor. In re Save Our Springs (S.O.S)
Alliance, Inc., 632 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2011).
187
See supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting the divergent results of
the application of the absolute priority rule to public companies and close
corporations).
186
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addressing a for-profit or nonprofit entity, is not fair and
equitable unless creditors are provided for as much as possible
until they are paid in full.
B.

Example Applications

As an initial example, take a nonprofit without members.188
Assume that the reorganizing nonprofit has one tier of secured
debt and general unsecured creditors. Also assume that holders
of the secured debt are undersecured. Further assume that the
nonprofits’ proposed reorganization plan provides that holders of
the debt will receive a secured note that compensates them in full
on account of the secured portion of their claim, and that the
holders of the debt and general unsecured creditors will receive
approximately 50% on account of their unsecured claims. Finally
assume that the plan also allocates $50 million to a general fund
for expanding the nonprofits’ operations to provide services
encompassed by the nonprofit’s mission and similar to services
historically made available, but not previously offered by the
nonprofit, and that this $50 million would increase the
distribution to unsecured creditors to approximately 55% on
account of their unsecured claims.
This plan is not fair and equitable. It apportions funds to
the reorganized nonprofit that allow the nonprofit to expand
solely by way of the reorganization. In so allocating, it provides
$50 million to the nonprofits’ management that they do not need
to keep the nonprofit afloat post-reorganization. It is as if the
managers, directors, and the portion of society that generally
benefits from the nonprofit’s existence are receiving $50 million
in dividends. These funds represent going concern value and
belong to its unsecured creditors. Unless unsecured creditors
consent to the expansion provided for by the plan, the plan
cannot be confirmed. Even though the nonprofit has no members
and, thus, the absolute priority rule as codified is categorically
inapplicable as against the nonprofit itself retaining going
concern value, the nonprofit must not be allowed to benefit from
its reorganization simply because it does not have the equivalent

188
This example is inspired by the first plan of reorganization proposed by the
Las Vegas Monorail Corporation (“LVMC”). Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization, In re
Las Vegas Monorail Co., No. 10-10464-bam (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 13, 2010), Doc. No.
516.
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of equity holders. When presented with such a scheme, a court
should read the core principles of the absolute priority rule into
the open-ended fair and equitable standard and reject the plan.
If the managers and directors of the reorganized nonprofit
believe it advantageous to expand the nonprofit’s operations,
they must look outside the nonprofit for the necessary capital,
such as taking out a loan that the nonprofit will be able to repay
with anticipated future charitable gifts or revenues from the
expansion.
The rule applies in the same way to nonprofits which courts
deciding absolute priority claims have encountered: nonprofits
with members. A court’s initial inquiry should be into the nature
of membership. But even if a court finds that the nonprofit’s
members are not the equivalent of a for-profit’s equity holders,
the court has not completed its inquiry into the fair and equitable
standard.
Take the labor union addressed by the Ninth
Circuit.189 Assume that the members are properly classified as
unsecured creditors, as the Ninth Circuit found.190 Also assume
that in addition to continuing the labor union’s current
affiliations,191 the plan contemplates affiliating with another
“parent” union. Further assume that the reorganizing union
believes the added affiliation will benefit the union and its
members, but that the extra affiliation will require the union
retain an extra $5 per member per month to pay the “per capita
tax” for the affiliation, thereby increasing its monthly operational
expenses. Finally assume that all other provisions of the
proposed plan remain the same, including that member dues are
not raised.
In this example, it is slightly less obvious that the plan is not
fair and equitable. The plan merely calls for the reorganized
labor union affiliating with another “parent” union, which, upon
initial consideration, seems to fall within the union’s prereorganization operations.192 But adding an affiliation materially
189

See supra notes 139–153 and accompanying text.
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
191
See supra notes 140 and 142 and accompanying text.
192
When a debtor reorganizes, it is assumed that the debtor-in-possession will
reconstitute the ailing business primarily by selling and rearranging assets, not
purchasing new assets. For example, a restaurant may change its fare—and interior
and exterior decorations—from Mexican to Italian, but it will not reorganize from a
restaurant into a clothing boutique. Thereby, a business’s overall postreorganization operations should reflect its pre-reorganization operations.
190
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changes the benefits the union’s members receive. And it does so
without requiring that the union find financing for the additional
affiliation. Instead, the $5 per member per month must come
from going concern value otherwise distributable to the union’s
creditors. If its members were found to be the equivalent of
equity holders, it might be clearer that the extra affiliation
amounts to a distribution to members. It is as if the union’s
members each are receiving $5 per month in dividends that they
are electing to reinvest in the union. Indeed, the plan provides
the exact opposite of what creditors objected to—rather than
increase member dues or terminate affiliations,193 the plan
effectively expands the pre-reorganization operations of the
union while leaving dues unchanged, allowing the union’s
members to improve the union through reorganization. Unless
unsecured creditors consent to the expansion, a court cannot
confirm the plan. As with the previous example, a court should
read the core principles of the absolute priority rule into the
open-ended fair and equitable standard and reject the plan.
V.

CRITICISMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING THE ABSOLUTE
PRIORITY RULE

In crafting a theory that holds reorganizing nonprofits to the
same standards applicable to reorganizing for-profits, this Article
makes some key assumptions that may raise criticisms of the
theory. This Part of the Article identifies and addresses three
potential criticisms.194 In responding to these criticisms, it begins
to explore the implications of applying Chapter 11 to nonprofits.
Most notably, the theory assumes that the reorganizing
nonprofit remains a nonprofit following reorganization. The
theory also assumes that the reorganization plan allocates as
much going concern value as possible to the nonprofit’s
creditors—that is, all going concern value not necessary for the
nonprofit to operate post-reorganization is available first and
foremost to creditors until they are paid in full.195 As the above
examples demonstrate, the nonprofit may pay its ordinary course
of business expenses, but it may not significantly expand its
operations, such as adding a hospital wing or purchasing cutting

193
194
195

See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
Special thanks to Professor Lynn M. LoPucki for discussing these criticisms.
See supra notes 131 & 153 and accompanying text.
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edge medical equipment not available at similar hospitals.
Unfortunately, in some instances, these two assumptions may
clash.
In assuming that all going concern value of a reorganizing
nonprofit is allocated first to creditors until they are paid in full,
the theory necessarily affords creditors ownership of the
reorganized nonprofit. The going concern value of an ongoing
entity is the value of the assets of that entity as an operating
whole;196 thus, the creditors own the nonprofit. Through this
ownership, creditors conceivably control the fundamental
operations and structure of the reorganized nonprofit, which
includes determining whether the nonprofit remains a nonprofit
post-reorganization. Stated succinctly, if all going concern value
of the reorganized nonprofit is the property of creditors until they
are paid in full, the creditors should have the ability to
reorganize the nonprofit into a for-profit.
This outcome obviously conflicts with the theory’s
assumption that the reorganizing nonprofit will remain a
nonprofit post-reorganization.
The question then becomes
whether it is imperative that a reorganizing nonprofit remain a
nonprofit. Part of the reason nonprofits increasingly are seeking
to reorganize potentially is that their management is under
pressure to operate nonprofits more like for-profits.197 If so, and
particularly if a nonprofit is financially unstable, then it might be
most practical to convert into a for-profit. Reorganization may be
the most efficient vehicle to realign a nonprofit’s structure with
the expectations of its stakeholders, such as donors and creditors.
Accordingly, the assumption that a nonprofit will remain a
nonprofit through reorganization may be dispensable.
Nevertheless, converting from a nonprofit to a for-profit
represents a fundamental change that seemingly affects the core
of a nonprofit’s mission. If a nonprofit cannot survive without
reorganizing, and if all going concern value must be allocated to
the nonprofit’s creditors in that reorganization to abide by the
purposes underlying the Bankruptcy Code, perhaps that
nonprofit should be ineligible for reorganization unless its
196
See Linda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors
in the Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REV. 283, 289 (1991) (“[G]oingconcern value reflects the enhanced value of assets arising from their combination
within an operating business.”).
197
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

WF_Foohey (Do Not Delete)

80

12/14/2012 9:12 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:31

creditors specifically agree that the nonprofit will reorganize as a
nonprofit. This outcome resembles the absolute priority rule’s
application to close corporations. Unless creditors consent to a
close corporation’s owners retaining an interest in the
reorganized business, the close corporation often cannot
reorganize and the owners lose their business.198 Similarly,
unless creditors consent to the nonprofit remaining a nonprofit,
the nonprofit cannot reorganize and most likely will dissolve. As
with a close corporation, only if a nonprofit’s creditors approve
will the nonprofit survive. Both sets of creditors give up
something they are entitled to in exchange for the debtor’s
survival. Creditors of a close corporation renounce a portion of
their interest in the reorganized corporation, and creditors of a
nonprofit forfeit their ability to transform the nonprofit into a
for-profit.199
The theory also can be criticized for allocating all going
concern value of the reorganized nonprofit first and foremost to
creditors. Such allocation may not be feasible. Many nonprofits
survive based on donations from individuals.200 If a reorganized
nonprofit’s creditors are entitled to all going concern value until
they are paid in full, they necessarily are entitled to donations
198

See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
The ability to transform the debtor nonprofit into a for-profit postreorganization may be conceptualized as part of the going concern value of the
debtor to which creditors are entitled. Unless they agree otherwise, the absolute
priority rule requires that value be allocated to creditors. Because this value allows
a nonprofit’s creditors to initiate a change that fundamentally alters the nonprofit,
the Bankruptcy Code would need to be amended to provide a special rule for
nonprofits that prohibits their reorganization unless their creditors consent to their
continuation as nonprofits post-reorganization. This rule will provide nonprofits’
creditors with the same bargaining power they should be afforded by the absolute
priority rule: They will be able to threaten to withhold their consent to the
reorganization if they disapprove of the debtor’s proposed plan. Though this
bargaining power may seem to give a nonprofit’s creditors too much leverage, the
creditors of close corporations are provided with similar leverage.
Alternatively, the rule could provide that a nonprofit’s creditors must consent to the
reorganization of a nonprofit debtor as a nonprofit if the debtor’s proposed plan
allocates all going concern value first and foremost to creditors until they are paid in
full. Logically, under this rule, creditors should realize that they are vulnerable if a
nonprofit reorganizes, and they may adjust credit terms and other aspects of their
business relationships with nonprofits accordingly.
200
See GIVING USA 2011, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR
THE YEAR 2010, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2011) (stating that donations from
individuals comprised 73% of the revenue from donations received by nonprofits in
2010), available at http://www.givingusareports.org/products/GivingUSA_2011_
ExecSummary_Print.pdf.
199
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made to the nonprofit post-reorganization. But will a nonprofit
continue to receive donations if individuals know that the
nonprofit’s creditors can access those donations—that they
effectively are paying the nonprofit’s creditors? Similarly, a
sizable portion of nonprofits’ operating budgets may derive from
grants, either from private institutions or state and federal
government agencies.201
Like individual donors, will these
institutions choose to give to a reorganized nonprofit when those
grants will go to supporting the nonprofit’s creditors? Will
government agencies feel pressured to forego awarding grants to
reorganized nonprofits because they anticipate that their
constituents will disapprove of funds effectively going to the
nonprofits’ creditors?
Perhaps reorganized nonprofits will continue to receive
funding because individual donors and grant-giving agencies will
want to support nonprofits despite the consequences of their
reorganization. For example, perhaps these individuals and
agencies will continue giving because they historically supported
a certain nonprofit and that nonprofit’s goodwill and record—
notwithstanding its reorganization—still will draw them to it.
But there is a distinct chance that a reorganized nonprofit will be
unable to attract funding because donors and grant-giving
agencies will divert funds that otherwise would have gone to the
reorganized nonprofit to another nonprofit with a similar
mission, thereby ensuring that their money will be used to
further the cause they want to support. This outcome seems
especially likely given that if a nonprofit liquidates or dissolves,
its directors and management are free to start a new nonprofit
with the same mission. This new nonprofit effectively will be the
same as the reorganized nonprofit except it will not be bound to
its pre-reorganization creditors. Thus, all funding the new
nonprofit receives will be available first and foremost for
fulfilling its mission.

201
See id. (stating that donations from foundations and corporations comprised
19% of the revenue from donations received by nonprofits in 2010). According to the
National Center for Charitable Statistics, in 2004, government grants made up
about 9 percent of nonprofits’ revenue. See Frequently Asked Questions, NATIONAL
CENTER
FOR
CHARITABLE
STATISTICS,
http://nccs.urban.org/
FAQ/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
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Accordingly, it may not be feasible to allocate all of the
reorganized nonprofits’ going concern first and foremost to
creditors if a nonprofit is to survive post-reorganization. Rather,
the nonprofit’s creditors may need to accept the going concern
value less donations and similar funding, either by agreement or
by force. Though creditors may agree to such an arrangement
because they understand that the alternative is liquidation, if
creditors are forced to accept this arrangement, the objectives
underlying the absolute priority rule will be violated. In effect, a
version of the “best efforts” standard commentators recommend
applying to close corporations and similar entities will be applied
to nonprofits;202 the reorganized nonprofit will be required to use
its “best efforts” to allocate all available funds to repaying
creditors, but if some of these funds, such as donations and
grants, cannot be made available to creditors without the
reorganized nonprofit failing, then the funds may be withheld.
This solution, however, will create the same dichotomy between
for-profit and nonprofit reorganization that exists now. Entities
that otherwise would be unable to reorganize absent their
nonprofit status will survive simply because they are nonprofits.
Alternatively, recognizing that certain nonprofits will be
unable to survive post-reorganization if creditors are allocated all
going concern value, perhaps these nonprofits simply should not
be allowed to reorganize. Courts have rejected nonprofits’
proposed reorganization plans upon determining that the plans
were not feasible because they contemplated unrealistic levels of
future funding.203 Indeed, the result of applying the principles of
the absolute priority rule to nonprofit reorganization may be to
prevent confirmation of more proposed plans on the basis of
anticipated future funding. As more nonprofits that rely on
donations and grants reorganize and either succeed or fail postreorganization, it will become clear whether funding ceases if
nonprofits are required to abide by the absolute priority rule. If
so, depending on the portion of nonprofits that rely on donations
and grants to survive, this may prohibit a large percentage of

202

See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Save Our Springs (S.O.S.) Alliance, Inc. v. WSI (II)-COS, L.L.C. (In
re Save Our Springs (S.O.S) Alliance, Inc.), 632 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming
bankruptcy court’s denial of plan confirmation when the proposed plan was not
feasible because the debtor had not demonstrated sufficient commitments from
donors).
203
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nonprofits from reorganizing. Those nonprofits that are unable
to reorganize will liquidate or dissolve; if there is enough
interest, they can re-emerge as new nonprofits.
Finally, the theory identifies a nonprofit’s managers as one
of the groups who are substantively akin to owners for the
purposes of applying the absolute priority rule to reorganizing
nonprofits. Managers, however, inhabit their own position in
reorganizations. Debtors may offer managers incentive packages
designed to entice them to remain with the debtor through its
reorganization, debtors may eliminate managers it believes are
ineffective or burdensome, creditors and other parties in interest
may move to have certain managers removed and a chief
restructuring officer appointed, and internal battles over postreorganization management positions may erupt. Even so, the
theory remains workable if managers are not deemed to stand-in
for equity holders. The theory ultimately turns on whether a
nonprofit preserves going concern value for itself—and, thereby,
its founders, board, members, or, generally, the part of society
that benefits from the nonprofit’s continued operation—instead of
allocating that value to creditors until they are paid in full.
Nonetheless, similar to managers of a close corporation, a
nonprofit’s managers may be the same individuals as the
nonprofit’s founders, directors, and members. In identifying
managers as beneficiaries of an incongruously applied absolute
priority rule, the theory recognizes and highlights the dichotomy
created by courts’ current application of the absolute priority rule
and fair and equitable standard to for-profit and nonprofit
entities. Overall, once courts clearly apply the absolute priority
rule through the fair and equitable standard to reorganizing
nonprofits, the viability of reorganization for different types of
nonprofits may begin to become more apparent. As more
information about the bankruptcies of nonprofits is gathered, the
unique issues that arise when nonprofits seek to reorganize will
become more perceptible, and the implication of applying
Chapter 11 to nonprofits that this discussion has begun to
explore will be better judged.
CONCLUSION
The absolute priority rule protects creditors from
manipulation of their priority to going concern value of a
reorganizing entity by guaranteeing that a court will not confirm
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a plan that subordinates their claims to the benefit of the
debtor’s equity holders without the creditors’ consent. It thereby
prevents owners, who may be the same as management, from
taking advantage of their insider status to the detriment of
creditors or colluding with senior creditors to freeze out
intermediate claimants. The absolute priority rule also affords
creditors a critical negotiation tool by way of their ability to
object to a plan that they suspect allocates going concern value
away from the creditors to which it belongs. Without the rule,
unsecured creditors in particular find themselves relatively
defenseless against attempts by secured creditors and owners to
use reorganization to discharge debt while retaining a stake in
the reorganized entity.
In the context of reorganizations of for-profit entities, the
absolute priority rule’s application is straight-forward and wellestablished. Only if the reorganizing debtor provides for its
creditors in full can equity holders receive any of the reorganized
business’s going concern value. Conversely, the few courts that
have encountered absolute priority rule arguments in the context
of nonprofit bankruptcies have struggled to apply the rule to the
reorganizing nonprofit. Though the nonprofit’s proposed plan
may allow directors, managers, or members to retain control of
the reorganized nonprofit, and though the plan may appear to
allow the reorganized nonprofit to retain going concern value
that most likely belong to creditors, courts have found the
absolute priority rule categorically satisfied by or inapplicable to
nonprofits except in limited circumstances.
Conceivably, courts could hold that such plans violate the
Bankruptcy Code’s mandate that plans be proposed in good
faith.204 To determine whether a plan meets the good faith
requirement, courts examine whether the plan maximizes the
value of the bankruptcy estate—that is, whether a plan allocates
going concern value to creditors until they are paid in full.205

204

11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(3) (West 2011).
See, e.g., Sec. Farms v. Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union,
Local 890 (In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 890), 265
F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that courts focus on whether a plan is
consistent with the primary objectives of the Bankruptcy Code in evaluating good
faith); Crestar Bank v. Walker (In re Walker), 165 B.R. 994, 1001 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(noting that “the failure of a debtor to use the full reach of its disposable resources to
repay creditors is evidence that a plan is not proposed in good faith because such
205
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Nevertheless, the existence of the good faith requirement has not
prompted courts to include detailed inquiries into the allocation
of going concern value in their opinions addressing nonprofit
reorganizations. With nonprofit reorganizations on the rise,
courts will need to consider the history and principles underlying
the absolute priority rule in order to hold nonprofits to the same
standards that Chapter 11 imposes on other reorganizing
entities.
Though courts have correctly held that the absolute priority
rule, as explicitly codified in the Bankruptcy Code, may not apply
to most nonprofits, the rule represents only one facet of the fair
and equitable standard. The theory underlying the absolute
priority rule remains relevant to nonprofit reorganizations and
should be considered when deciding whether a nonprofit’s
reorganization plan is fair and equitable. The history of the rule
demonstrates that it is less about equity holders retaining value
in a reorganized entity, as it is written into the Bankruptcy Code,
and more about ensuring that a proposed plan provides for
creditors to the greatest extent possible.
Accordingly, to
determine whether a nonprofit’s plan is not fair and equitable, a
court merely needs to investigate whether the plan is too good a
deal for the nonprofit. In short, does the plan assign going
concern value to the nonprofit that should go to creditors? If so,
the plan is not fair and equitable for the same reasons that a
similar plan proposed for a for-profit entity should be found to
violate the absolute priority rule.
Courts addressing absolute priority claims in the context of
nonprofit reorganizations have overlooked or only marginally
acknowledged the connection between the absolute priority rule
and the fair and equitable standard. Recognizing that the core
tenets of the absolute priority rule may be and should be
considered when evaluating a nonprofit’s plan will ensure that
creditors benefit from one of the protections the Bankruptcy Code
specifically affords them and will bring courts one step closer to
applying all of Chapter 11’s rigorous approval criteria to
nonprofits. It also will elucidate some of the unique issues that
arise when nonprofits seek to reorganize, laying the foundation
to better evaluate the viability of nonprofit reorganization.

conduct frustrates” one of the “primary objective[s] of a Chapter 11 reorganization,”
that is, “prompt payment of creditors”).

